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ON THE ROAD TO RECONCEIVING RIGHTS FOR
CHILDREN: A POSTFEMINIST ANALYSIS OF THE
CAPACITY PRINCIPLE
Katherine Hunt Federle*
We now breathlessly await the analog to sociology's favorite egg-chicken
story (that is, that a chicken is an egg's way of producing another egg):
namely, that an adult is a child's way of producing another child.'
INTRODUCTION
I like this quotation. It may seem whimsical to some, but I think
that it provides us with a perspective so obvious and yet so startling
that we are forced to reexamine some of our assumptions about our
children and their role in society, assumptions that are so deeply
embedded they have channeled our dialogue and forced us down cir-
cular paths of analysis. Within the children's rights debate, these
assumptions collapse around one central, organizing principle: ca-
pacity. Whether or not children have capacity has never been re-
solved to anyone's particular satisfaction although legal scholars,
developmentalists, psychologists, and sociologists have weighed into
the fray and have pronounced, with varying degrees of certainty,
that the question has been settled.2 But capacity continues to infuse
* Associate Professor of Law, Tulane Law School. I wish to thank Michael Wald and my
colleagues at Tulane Law School, John Stick, Steve Griffin, Terry O'Neill, and Alan Childress,
for their insightful comments and unfailing support.
1. Marx Wartofsky, The Child's Construction of the World and the World's Construction of
the Child: From Historical Epistemology to Historical Psychology, in THE CHILD AND OTHER
CULTURAL INVENTIONS 188, 202 (Frank S. Kessel & Alexander W. Siegel eds., 1983). Wartofsky
argues that childhood is a cultural predicate which reflects our society and culture rather than
neutral psychological and biogenetic characterizations. Id. at 193-94. He contends that we need
an historical psychology which recognizes not only the cultural and social factors of childhood, but
also the norms that affect our psychological theory and methods of inquiry. Id. at 213. These
norms are themselves the product of deeply embedded cultural and historical conceptions, and we
will never be able to truly understand childhood until we acknowledge our own biases and perspec-
tives. Id. at 213-14.
2. See THE CHILD AND OTHER CULTURAL INVENTIONS, supra note 1; HOWARD COHEN, EQUAL
RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN (1980); RICHARD FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS (1974); M.D.A. FREEMAN, THE
RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF CHILDREN (1983); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL.. BEYOND THE BEST INTER-
ESTS OF THE CHILD (1973); JOHN CALDWELL HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD (1974); GARY B.
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the dispute with obfuscating rhetoric about the meaning of having
and exercising rights, drawing the analysis away from a critical ex-
amination of the organizing principle itself.
Capacity is deeply embedded in our concept of rights for reasons
both historical and social. Those philosophies the Framers of our
Constitution and the Bill of Rights found so attractive took compe-
tency as a necessary prerequisite, illustrating the correctness and in-
dispensability of the principle by specifically excluding women and
children from the category of rights holders.3 This legacy persists in
modern legal philosophies, albeit with a nod towards women's, but
not necessarily children's, equality and is the foundation upon which
the children's rights theorists have built." The social context, too, in
which the development of the paternalistic nuclear family coincided
with these classic formulations of rights,' reinforced the notion of
women's and children's incapacities. Although women have had
some success in shifting the dialogue of rights beyond arguments
MELTON, REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH (1987); LAURA M.
PURDY. IN THEIR BEST INTEREST?: THE CASE AGAINST EQUAL RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN (1992);
WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CHILD?: THE PROBLEMS OF PROXY CONSENT (Willard Gaylin & Ruth
Macklin eds., 1982); Bruce C. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some
Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 605; Irving R.
Kaufman, The Child in Trouble: The Long and Difficult Road to Reforming the Crazy-Quilt
Juvenile Justice System, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 743 (1982); Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses:
Psycho-Legal Perspectives on Children's Rights, 16 NOVA L. REV. 711 (1992); Raymond F.
Marks, Detours on the Road to Maturity: A View of the Legal Conception of Growing Up and
Letting Go, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 78 (1975); Gary B. Melton, Developmental Psychology
and the Law. The State of the Art, 22 J. FAM. L. 445 (1984); Onora O'Neill, Children's Rights
and Children's Lives, 98 ETHICS 445 (1988); Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 487 (1973); Ferdinand Schoeman, Childhood Competence and Autonomy, 12 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 267 (1983).
3. JEREMY BENTHAM. THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 209-15 (C.K. Ogden ed., Harcourt Brace
& Co. 1931) (1864); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 187 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1991) (1651); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 78-80 (John
Ladd trans., The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965) (1797); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT 47-49 (Henry Regnery Co. 1955) (1689); JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, HIS EDUCA-
TIONAL THEORIES SELECTED FROM EMILE, JULIE AND OTHER WRITINGS 27-28, 92-96 (R.L.
Archer ed., Barron's Educ. Series, Inc. 1964).
4. See infra part II (discussing modern children's rights theories).
5. For a definitive history of Western childhood, see PHILIPPE ARItS, CENTURIES OF CHILD-
HOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE (Robert Baldick trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1962)
(1960). Arias contends that until the end of the Middle Ages, children were small adults who
played, worked, and lived with their elders. Id. at 33-38. The separation of children from adults
and the development of that distinct phase of life we now call childhood closely parallels changes
in the family, society, and the economic structure. Id. at 33-49. Hafen suggests that Arias should
be cited for the proposition that childhood has been rediscovered, not recently invented. Hafen,
supra note 2, at 613-14. For a more recent account of the history of childhood, see JOHN SOMMER-
VILLE. THE RISE AND FALL OF CHILDHOOD (1982).
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about competence,6 when discussing the concept of children's rights,
the debate invariably returns to the capacity of children.
It is my contention not only that competency is unnecessary to
any formulation of rights for children, but also that it is extremely
confining to rights theory in ways that make it difficult to concep-
tualize, much- less acknowledge, the rights of children and other
groups. There are, for example, instances when we speak of rights
for certain identifiable interests knowing that those groups indispu-
tably lack the capacities we normally associate with rights holders.
In the final analysis, these existing dialogues between animal rights
activists, deep ecologists, and advocates for the mentally incompe-
tent fail to adequately account for the limiting effects of capacity on
their rights theories.7 They do, however, refocus and enrich the
analysis of rights for children by revealing that capacity is part of
the language of hierarchy and status, of exclusion and inequality.
We must reconstruct rights talk about children in terms of power,
and only when we make explicit the role of capacity is a new theory
of rights for children possible.
I propose to challenge the implications of a rights theory that has
handicapped not only women and minorities, but also children. This
is, essentially, a feminist undertaking for the methods used are femi-
nist legal methods; to paraphrase, I am "asking the child question."8
But even feminist theorists have fallen prey to the narrow vision of
their own perspectives and need to reconstruct their rights theories
to repudiate the delimiting principle of capacity. As women, we
must recognize that power seduces regardless of gender, that our
own rights talk may incorporate notions of hierarchy and status.9 I
6. See AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY (Martha Albertson
Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds., 1991); ELIZABETH KINGDOM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH
RIGHTS?: PROBLEMS FOR FEMINIST POLITICS OF LAW (1991); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW (1990).
7. See infra part II1 (discussing children's rights in the context of the discussions of animal
rights activists, deep ecologists, and advocates for the mentally incompetent).
8. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 836-37 (1990).
Bartlett identifies three methods upon which feminists rely when discussing aspects of a legal issue
that a more traditional analysis might overlook. The first, "asking the woman question," exposes
the narrow perspective of substantive law. The second, feminist practical reasoning, expands no-
tions of legal relevance in order to consider nontraditional features of a case, features that may
reveal the singular perspective of the law. The third method, consciousness-raising, tests the valid-
ity of traditional legal standards by relating the experiences of those directly affected by their
application. Id. at 836.
9. 1 am hardly the first woman to worry about the seductive and co-opting effects of power. For
an earlier and forceful account of this problem, see SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF
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do not think this means, however, that feminist legal methods have
little to offer to an analysis of children's rights; on the contrary, I
think this may be the only way to widen our vision.
My point here is that an adequate rights theory must account for
power. Power is the obverse of social oppression and political ine-
quality, for it licenses hierarchy and status. Rights, however, miti-
gate the exclusionary effects of power by allowing the powerless to
access existing political and legal structures in order to make claims.
Permitting these types of rights claims also has the salutary effect of
redistributing power and altering hierarchies. Herein lies the real
value of rights, for rights require that we respect the marginalized,
empower the powerless, and strengthen the weak.
Children's rights theories are inadequate precisely because they
fail to accommodate notions of power. Whether we speak of rights
as the power to obligate others or as a set of interests, we still tie
these accounts to the competencies of the rights holders either by
claiming that children do not have the requisite will to obligate
others or by identifying children's interests in ways that promote
their incapacities. If rights are inclusive, and I think they must be if
we speak in terms of power and access, then they must also mean-
ingfully challenge hierarchy and status. As a practical matter, the
kinds of rights envisioned here are legal and political; the moral
rights of children, I think, are inextricably tied to concepts of status
and, in any event, have only emotional force. Of course, it is possible
that individual rights have less significance because they cannot be
reconceived in this way, and while that anti-rights position does hold
some attraction, I think rights have enough value to make an at-
tempt at reconstruction a worthwhile endeavor.
This Article, then, is the first part of that endeavor; it seeks to
explain why existing legal standards disadvantage children by ex-
posing the hierarchical nature of capacity in rights theory. I begin
by tracing the role of competency in the formulation of traditional
theories of individual rights to illuminate both the centrality of ca-
pacity and its exclusionary effects. The Article next explores the in-
fluence of these traditional philosophies on the current debate about
children's rights and reveals the incorporation of principles of capac-
ity, hierarchy, and exclusion into children's rights theories. It is only
by elucidating the role of capacity in the articulation of rights that
SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST REVOLUTION (1970).
[Vol. 42:983
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we open the dialogue to include more meaningful concepts of power
and access. Although this Article does not propose a new rights the-
ory, a task I have left for a subsequent article, it does start down the
road to reconceiving rights by discussing the ways in which tradi-
tional rights talk disadvantages children.
I. LOCATING THE COMPETENCY PRINCIPLE IN HISTORICAL
CONTEXT
The notion of capacity as a prerequisite to having rights has both
historical and analytical relevance to the American legal tradition of
individualism from which children have been excluded. Seventeenth-
and eighteenth-century philosophers, who premised individual rela-
tions with the state upon a certain rationality and who barred chil-
dren from the class of rights holders because of their incom-
petencies, profoundly influenced this country's Founders. ° These
theorists grounded subsequent dialectics, which unquestioningly in-
corporated capacity as an organizing principle, ,in the articulation of
individual liberties. In turn, modern reconstructivists of rights draw
heavily upon the debates of their predecessors, adopting preexisting
concepts of childhood and capacity and their relevance to having
rights. It is by tracing this role of the competent rights holder in our
individualist tradition that we reveal its hierarchical and exclusion-
ary implications and its uncritical acceptance by rights theorists.
A. The Social Contract: For Adults Only
Social compact theorists constructed a rights theory premised
upon a competence to contract that excludes children and envisions
a hierarchical ordering of liberty. Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau,
who influenced our nation's Founders, argued that children have no
freedom because of their incompetencies and are instead subject to
parental authority until they attain capacity. The assurance of lib-
erty provided by the social contract between ruler and ruled, there-
fore, does not extend to children. But the social compact theorists
articulated a vision of childhood and family that influenced their
own jurisprudence as well as present notions about children and par-
10. Hafen, supra note 2, at 610-11. Hafen argues that because children have never been in-
cluded in any theoretical formulation of individual rights, there are several compelling reasons to
continue to exclude them. These include children's needs and incapacities and the societal value in
protecting parental initiative. Id. at 611-12.
1993]
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ents. It is to these familial power relationships that the social com-
pact theorists analogize when speaking of the state's authority over
its own citizens.
Hobbes, for example, found a direct parallel between the family
and a monarchical form of government. For Hobbes, life in nature is
"poore, nasty, brutish, and short,"'1 where man (I use the term pur-
posefully) is ruled by his passions and war is a constant compan-
ion. 2 But the rational, self-interested man may escape the natural
life by covenanting with others for the creation of a body politic
governed by a sovereign who provides for the "peace and common
defense."'" Hobbes identified two ways in which a body politic may
be created: (1) by men who covenant with one another voluntarily
(in Hobbes's unique sense of the word)' 4 to create a commonwealth
by institution and (2) as a consequence of compulsion or accident of
birth, in which case a commonwealth by acquisition is formed.' 5
The latter Hobbes called a patrimonial kingdom and is to be pre-
ferred over a democracy or an aristocracy.16
According to Hobbes, the relationship between sovereign and sub-
ject most clearly parallels that between father and family member.
In a state of nature, the mother has the right of dominion over her
11. HOBBES, supra note 3, at 89. In many ways, Leviathan is a compilation of Hobbes's previ-
ous works collected and synthesized under one (aptly named) title. The "Leviathan" is, itself, the
commonwealth or state, the artificial man. Id. at 9.
12. Id. at 89. "In such condition, there is no place for Industry ... and consequently no Cul-
ture . . . no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of
violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short." Id.
13. Id. at 120-21.
14. Hobbes argued that our actions may be voluntary even when we act out of fear because
these actions are merely the product of making hard choices. THOMAS HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS OF
LAW: NATURAL & POLITIC 47-48 (Ferdinand Tonnies ed., 1928) (1640). Hobbes wrote Elements
eleven years before Leviathan, and it is a more concise version of his theory of the state and
individual liberty.
15. HOBBES, supra note 14, at 83-84; HOBBES, supra note 3, at 121. Hobbes identified three
ways in which men consent to be governed: by voluntary offer of subjection, in which case a
commonwealth by institution is created, by yielding to compulsion, or by accident of birth, in
which instances a commonwealth by acquisition is formed. Id. Who will govern determines the
form of the commonwealth: if many govern, they form a democracy; if government is by the few,
then an aristocracy is created; if only one will govern, then a monarchy is created. Id. at 129.
16. HOBBES, supra note 14, at 99, 110-13. Hobbes identified five "inconveniences" of monar-
chy: great power wielded by one man alone; favoritism of the monarch towards his children and
friends; the abuses of power wreaked on the people by the monarch's family and friends; the
monarch's power to alter laws; and the aptitude of a monarchy to lapse into civil war. Id. at 110-
13. Hobbes concluded that while these may be problems in any monarchy, they also are problems
in a democracy or an aristocracy. In these latter forms of government, the problems are magnified
because the number of individuals in power is greater and, therefore, the potential for abuse is
higher. Id. at 112-13.
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children because she has the power to preserve or destroy them; she
chooses to preserve them because children are presumed to have
promised her obedience in exchange for this gift. 7 A man has do-
minion over his children, however, only through a specific covenant
with the' mother granting him such authority; marriage presumes
such a covenant and creates the right of dominion in the father, who
has absolute power over his children.18 He also may acquire servants
through conquest or by their voluntary submission and will act as
their master; the servants, children, and parents thus comprise a
family of which the father is sovereign. 19 If the family multiplies
sufficiently through additional births, adoptions, or conquests so as
to enable its self-protection, the family becomes a patrimonial king-
dom." Children, then, may be the subjects of two sovereigns: one
parental and the other monarchical.
Hobbes argued that these relationships are essentially consensual
although this notion relies less on concepts of choice and liberty and
more on a recognition of the need to submit to the sovereign for
reasons of self-preservation. Children consent to their parents' do-
minion, either expressly "or by other sufficient arguments de-
clared,"'" out of recognition of the power that their parents have
over their lives. Children thus have a continuing obligation to obey
those who preserve and nourish them.22 Similarly, the sovereign has
dominion over his subjects and his subjects' children because he
may destroy them if they refuse to submit themselves to his author-
17. Id. at 103. Hobbes's assertion of a woman's right to her body and, consequently, a right
over her children who are a part of her body, may be one of the first modern articulations of a
woman's right to choose. "[Elvery man by the law of nature, hath right or propriety to his own
body, the child ought rather to be the propriety of the mother (of whose body it is part, till the
time of separation) than of the father." Id.
18. Id. at 104. Hobbes believed that in a marriage it is impossible for both husband and wife to
govern, so only the husband has that authority as he is better suited to the task. Id. Hobbes did
acknowledge that if the wife were a sovereign queen, she would have the power to govern and
dispose of their common property as the Queen (but not as wife). Id.
19. Id. at 105. Hobbes drew a distinction between children and servants. Children are freemen;
servants are not. Id.
20. Id. at 105-06. All that a servant has is transferred to his master, including his children, and
in this way succeeding generations of servants remain subject to the same master. Id. It is less
clear how the father's children's children are subject to their father and grandfather unless one
interprets the child's original obligation of obedience as permanent. If this is so, then succeeding
generations of children are bound because of the original promise. "He that hath the Dominion
over the Child, hath Dominion also over the Children of the Child; and over their Childrens
Children. For he that hath Dominion over the person of a man, hath Dominion over all that is his
.HOBBES, supra note 3, at 140-41.
21. Id. at 139.
22. Id. at 140.
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ity.23 Yet such consent, according to Hobbes, is no less voluntary
because it is motivated by fear: fear springs from the will (over
which we have control), and consent is merely the concurrence of
the will to some action.24
Despite this rather limited conception of consent, under Hobbes's
theory, children lack the requisite capacity to benefit from the laws
of the commonwealth. Children lack reason, although they have the
potential to attain it,26 and distinguish between good and evil only
because of "the correction they receive from their Parents."2 It is
this ability to reason that subjects citizens to law because those ra-
tional beings who contract with a sovereign for their protection
must, in turn, obey the commands of the sovereign. These com-
mands take the form of laws in the commonwealth, and only those
who have the ability to contract with the sovereign can take notice
of these laws and must submit to the laws' commands. 7 Children,
however, cannot take notice of these laws because of their irrational-
ity, although they remain subjects of the sovereign if only through
the simple expediency of being subjects of their parents over whom
the sovereign has dominion. 8
Over naturall fooles, children, or mad-men there is no Law, no more than
over brute beasts; nor are they capable of the title of just, or unjust; because
they had never power to make any covenant, or to understand the conse-
quences thereof; and consequently never took upon them to authorise the
actions of any Soveraign, as they must do that make to themselves a Com-
mon-wealth.2
9
Hobbes's articulation of the child's relationship to the common-
wealth and its laws found subsequent expression in Locke's theory
of the social contract. Locke argued that natural man is free, equal,
and independent; he may act and dispose of his possessions as he
sees fit provided he respects the equal rights of others to life, liberty,
23. Id. at 121.
24. HOBBES, supra note 14, at 48.
25. HOBBES, supra note 3, at 36 ("Children therefore are not endued with Reason at all, till
they have attained the use of Speech: but are called Reasonable Creatures, for the possibility
apparent of having the use of Reason in time to come.").
26. Id. at 73.
27. Id. at 187.
28. Id. at 140-42. Hobbes seems inconsistent on this point. On the one hand, children are capa-
ble of promising obedience to their parents, yet, on the other, children cannot obey the law be-
cause they lack reason, which seems to imply they lack the capacity to promise. For a critique of
Hobbes and others, see Victor L. Worsfold, A Philosophical Justification for Children's Rights,
44 HARV. EDUC. REv. 142 (1974).
29. HOBBES, supra note 3, at 187.
990 [Vol. 42:983
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and their possessions." Government, then, is the product of a volun-
tary contract between equals who have given up their power to the
political society in order to better protect their natural rights.31 The
power bestowed upon the government can be no greater than the
power held by its citizens and is simply a power to make laws to
preserve the lives, liberties, and possessions of its members. 2 It is
these laws in a political society which make us free because liberty
means freedom from restraint and without law there can be no such
liberty.33
Freedom, and the liberty to act according to one's will, however,
depend upon reason. Locke envisioned law as defining spheres of ac-
tivity in which each citizen could freely pursue his interests without
interfering with the rights of others; construed in this manner, law
"is not so much the limitation as the direction of a free and intelli-
gent agent to his proper interest . . . . -3 But to stay within the
bounds of the law, be it natural or political, each citizen must be
capable of knowing the law, and that knowledge comes by virtue of
each citizen's reason. 35 "The freedom . . . and liberty of acting ac-
cording to his own will, is grounded on his having reason, which is
able to instruct him in that law he is to govern himself by, and make
him know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will." 36 Con-
versely, one who lacks reason is incapable of knowing the law and
cannot be free.3 7
This connection between freedom and rationality is central to
30. LOCKE, supra note 3, at 4-6. Locke, who has been called the philosopher of individualism,
was extremely critical of Hobbes; Second Treatise is really a refutation of Hobbes's Leviathan.
31. Id. at 144. Locke wrote:
Political power is that power which every man having in the state of nature, has given
up into the hands of society, and therein to the governors whom the society hath set
over itself, with this express or tacit trust that it shall be employed for their good and
the preservation of their property . . . . [T]he end and measure of this power . . .
can have no other end or measure when in the hands of the magistrates but to pre-
serve the members of that society in their lives, liberties, and possessions ....
id.
32. Id. 144-45. Locke argued that the law of nature commands that each person is equal and
independent and that "no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions." Id.
at 5-6.
33. Id. at 44. Locke, however, noted that some men may be more equal than others: "Age or
virtue may give men a just precedency." Id. at 42.
34. Id. at 44.
35. Id. at 44-45. Locke contended that one is subject only to those laws that one has promul-
gated and that can be known only by virtue of reason. Id. at 44.
36. Id. at 49.
37. Id. at 44.
19931
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Locke's assertion that natural freedom and children's subjection to
their parents are compatible concepts founded on a shared principle
of liberty. Like Hobbes, Locke found the child in a state of igno-
rance and irrationality, a condition, however, that will eventually
give way to reason and the freedom to act in accordance with her
will. 8 During the child's period of incapacity, the parents have the
duty to care for the child, to educate her, and to govern her actions
until such time as she gains her reason and, consequently, her free-
dom. 9 This temporary state of inequality exists for the child's wel-
fare: "To turn him loose to an unrestrained liberty before he has
reason to guide him is not the allowing him the privilege of his na-
ture to be free, but to thrust him out amongst brutes, and abandon
him to a state as wretched . . . as theirs."4 0 But children will even-
tually become free and rational because they are born with that ca-
pacity for reason which enables men to be free.4'
It is the impermanence of this parental authority which ulti-
mately led Locke to reject the Hobbesian conception of dominion by
generation. Locke first refuted the concept of paternal power. For
Locke, the power over the child rests with both parents42 for the
duration of the child's minority; once the child has attained the age
of reason, she is free, and her parents have no more authority over
her than they would over any other free person.43 Of course, the
child has a continuing obligation to honor her parents, but this debt
does not diminish her freedom nor grant her parents additional au-
thority to command her choices.44 Hobbes's construction of a politi-
38. Id. at 43. Locke wrote:
Children, I confess, are not born in this full state of equality, though they are born to
it. Their parents have a sort of rule and jurisdiction over them when they come into
the world, and for some time after, but 'tis but a temporary one. The bonds of this
subjection are like swaddling clothes they are wrapped up in and supported by in the
weakness of their infancy. Age and reason, as they grow up, loosen them, till at length
they drop quite off, and leave a man at his own free disposal.
Id.
39. Id. at 45.
40. Id. at 49.
41. Id. at 47 ("Thus we are born free, as we are born rational; not that we have actually the
exercise of either: age that brings one, brings with it the other too.").
42. Id. at 41 ("Paternal power ... seems . . . to place the power of parents over their children
wholly in their father, as if the mother had no share in it . . . . [W]hatever obligation nature and
the right of generation lays on children, it must certainly bind them equally to both the concurrent
causes of it.").
43. Id. at 51. Locke noted that while the father may have authority over his children, he may
not dispose of their lives or their own property. Id.
44. Id. at 52.
[Vol. 42:983
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cal power that rests on paternal authority is misplaced, therefore,
precisely because he misconstrues the joint and impermanent nature
of parental obligations.
Locke's and Hobbes's views on freedom, children, and the family
profoundly influenced Rousseau's theory of social contract and edu-
cational philosophy. For Rousseau, the family is the first political
society, in which children remain only as long as their self-preserva-
tion requires."5 Once children are able to provide for themselves,
they are independent and no longer need obey their father who, in
turn, has no further obligations to his children." This desire for self-
preservation is the essence of natural liberty, and people will "alien-
ate their liberty only for their own advantage." '47 It is the social con-
tract which performs this feat of balancing the advantages of joining
forces for mutual protection with the desire for liberty: 48 the state
thus established is governed by all the people whose expression of
self-interest (what Rousseau termed the general will) is embodied in
the law.4
The social contract brings man closer to his natural state,50 which
alone can make him happy. Rousseau, disputing Locke's claim that
we are naturally rational beings, argued that in the natural state,
man is motivated by self-preservation to satisfy his physical wants
45. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 4 (G.D.H. Cole trans.,
E.P. Dutton & Co. 1950) (1762). Ironically, Rousseau was hardly the ideal parent. He had five
children, all of whom he left at a foundling home shortly after their births. I LESTER G. CROCKER,
JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU: THE QUEST 178-79 (1968).
46. ROUSSEAU, supra note 45, at 4. Rousseau wrote:
The most ancient of all societies, and the only one that is natural, is the family: and
even so the children remain attached to the father only so long as they need him for
their preservation. The children, released from the obedience they owed to the
father, and the father, released from the care he owed his children, return equally to
independence.
Id.
47. Id. at 4-5. ("The family then may be called the first model of political societies: the ruler
corresponds to the father, and the people to the children; and all, being born free and equal,
alienate their liberty only for their own advantage.").
48. Id. at 13-14 (describing the tension between the need to unite with others for self-preserva-
tion and the desire for individual freedom and liberty as the fundamental problem for which the
social contract provides the solution).
49. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, MEN AND CITIZENS: A STUDY OF ROUSSEAU'S SOCIAL THEORY 168-69
(1969). Shklar contends that the general will is Rousseau's "most original contribution to the
language of politics." Id. at 168. The general will is nothing more than pure self-interest, and it is
an interest shared by many because the prevention of inequality is the greatest interest that men
can commonly share in society. Id. at 169.
50. G.D.H. Cole, Introduction to ROUSSEAU, supra note 45, at xvii-xviii. The state of nature is
an idealized conception that embodies notions of man's fullest capabilities and the good. The
natural state is not that from which we evolved but that to which we are evolving. Id.
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and to avoid pain and death.5" The desire for self-preservation ne-
cessitates independence, and each individual in nature is equally and
freely independent, yet still in a state of innocence and ignorance. 52
Political society transforms our natural inclinations and fosters ine-
quality, dissension, greed, and a variety bf social ills.53 The social
contract, therefore, offers the promise of a return to freedom and
equality, to an innocence found in our natural state, while retaining
the advantages inherent in any social organization in which men
unite for their self-preservation.54
This belief in the natural innocence of humanity structures Rous-
seau's theory of education. Rousseau refuted Locke's claim that
children are rational beings from birth and proclaimed their natural
innocence.55 Children lack that capacity for rationality that Locke
proposed as the basis for their education;56 education should en-
courage children's natural tendencies to play and to experience life
without restraint rather than inhibit them with the premature impo-
sition of reason.5" Only after children begin to acquire reason at
about age twelve should they learn about the world through actual
experience, direct observation, and discovery. 58 Rousseau did not en-
vision childhood without structure, however, and stated that the
child must be made aware of his subjugation to adults "because
51. S.E. Frost, Biographical Note, in ROUSSEAU, supra note 3, at ii.
52. ROUSSEAU, supra note 45, at 271-72 ("[A]s there is hardly any inequality in the state of
nature, all the inequality which now prevails owes its strength and growth to the development of
our faculties and the advance of the human mind, and becomes at last permanent and legitimate
by the establishment of property and laws.").
53. Id. at 274 ("We may admire human society as much as we please; it will be none the less
true that it necessarily leads men to hate each other in proportion as their interests clash, and to
do one another apparent services, while they are doing every imaginable mischief.").
54. Id. at 13.
55. ROUSSEAU, supra note 3, at 95. Rousseau actually had two distinct educational theories,
one for boys and one for girls. Emile addresses the most appropriate education for boys, id. at 55-
216, while Julie discusses girls' education, id. at 26-54. Those principles he advocated in Emile do
not extend to girls; in fact, girls are imperfect and must be taught to obey men. Id. at 217-52.
Their education, therefore, must emphasize their subservience. See id. In the text, I have at-
tempted to avoid this obviously outdated view of women's relationships by using the term children,
but Rousseau was truly limiting his educational theories to boys when he wrote EtMile.
56. Id. at 95 ("Locke's great maxim was to reason with children; and it is the most popular
method at the present day. Its success does not appear to recommend it; for my own part, I have
never seen anyone so silly as those children with whom they have reasoned so much.").
57. Id. at 88-89.
58. Id. at 146-78. Rousseau extensively detailed his ideal of education, which corresponds to
the child's age. Id. at 76-216.
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others know better than himself what is good for him and what does
or does not conduce to his preservation." 59
For this reason, children are not participants in the social con-
tract. Self-preservation is the essence of liberty, and men will alien-
ate their liberty only if that alienation secures for them some
greater advantage. Children, though, do not have that capacity for
self-preservation and must rely on adults until they are able to care
for themselves. Without the liberating force of self-preservation,
children are dependent on others for their needs until they learn
what they need for themselves. The family, then, protects and de-
fends children until they mature and can act to preserve themselves.
But the exclusion, of the child from greater political participation
signifies a deeper consequence of capacity: incompetency does not
merely limit rights; it denies them entirely. The great contribution
of the social contractarians and, most particularly, that of Locke
was the reformulation of liberty as individual freedom from govern-
mental interference, a concept that infuses current Western political
thought. Social contractarians, however, premise the acquisition of
this freedom on a concept of competency, and they conclude that
the child lacks status as a rights holder precisely because the child's
incompetencies and weaknesses preclude participation in and benefit
from the social contract. Thus, the very notion of liberty as auton-
omy has exclusionary force. Although subsequent political theorists
challenged the fundamental tenets of social contract theory, they,
too, left unchallenged the exclusion of children from the class of
autonomous rights holders on the basis of their incapacities.
B. The Principle of Utility
Bentham and Mill found the concept of consent in the social con-
tract unsatisfactory as an explanation for the coexistence of liberty
and governmental authority. They sought to remedy this perceived
defect by reconstructing political society around the principle of
utility. This doctrine, grounded in our natural inclination to pursue
our own or others' pleasure and to avoid pain, makes these occupa-
tions the primary end of political society; consent is irrelevant to the
continued allegiance of the citizen to the state. Although utilitarian-
ism eliminates the concepts of consent and the capacity to consent,
it postulates a competency to seek personal happiness that, by its
59. Id. at 92.
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terms, is exclusionary. If children cannot know how to achieve their
own happiness, then their liberty can justifiably be curtailed by
others until they reach maturity.6 °
Bentham's political theory rests on this fundamental assumption
about human motivation. Human nature compels each individual to
pursue pleasure and avoid pain, and it is axiomatic that each person
is the best judge of that which causes either. 6 If the individual joins
political society, she does so only because she increases her pleasure
and reduces her pain by maintaining these political ties." The aim
of government, then, is to promote happiness of the governed63 and
to eliminate everything that may diminish pleasure through the in-
strument of law. 64 Law, however, cannot restrict the choices of the
individual to pursue only that happiness which involves no risk of
pain to her because such a restriction violates the individual's lib-
erty; the law may only presume that each individual's rationality
will prevent her from making such a potentially detrimental
choice.6 5
Despite this simple expedient of seeking pleasure and avoiding
pain, Bentham's principle of utility has no application to children.
Bentham argued that children suffer a "palpable and very consider-
able deficiency . . . in point of knowledge or understanding" that
renders them incapable "of directing [their] own inclination in the
pursuit of happiness."66 The child, therefore, must submit to the au-
thority of a guardian who will pursue the child's happiness until
such time as she may seek it for herself.67 "The feebleness of in-
60. See BENTHIAM, supra note 3, at 63; infra notes 62-79 and accompanying text (discussing the
utilitarian theories of Bentham and Mill).
61. BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 63.
62. Id. at 74.
63. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
74 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) (n.d.) ("The business of government is to promote the
happiness of the society, by punishing and rewarding.").
64. Id. at 158 ("The general object which all laws have, or ought to have, in common, is to
augment the total happiness of the community; and therefore, in the first place, to exclude, as far
as may be, every thing that tends to subtract from that happiness .... .
65. BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 63. Bentham wrote:
As a general rule, the greatest possible latitude should be left to individuals, in all
cases in which they can injure none but themselves, for they are the best judges of
their own interests. If they deceive themselves, it is to be supposed that the moment
they discover their error they will alter their conduct. The power of the law need
interfere only to prevent them from injuring each other.
Id.
66. BENTHAM, supra note 63, at 244-45.
67. Id. at 246.
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fancy demands a continual protection" that only "an authority more
immediate than that of the laws" can provide through a continual
process of education." That protection ends when the child reaches
maturity, an age arbitrarily set by law for reasons of expedience.69
It is the fact of infancy that permits adults to interfere with the
happiness of children, for children do not understand the future con-
sequences of their actions and, therefore, cannot be dissuaded from
pursuing a potentially detrimental course of conduct.7 0
Mill's theory of liberty, however, rests on a broader view of
human motivation: we can derive happiness from the pleasure of
others. Like Bentham, Mill believed that we are motivated by our
desire to seek pleasure and avoid pain but that we also find happi-
ness in virtue and spiritual perfection. 1 In our pursuit of happiness,
however, we are absolutely free from the interference of others un-
less, by our actions, we may harm someone other than ourselves. 2
Self-protection is the only justification for the restriction of individ-
ual autonomy in a community; paternalistic concerns for the welfare
of the individual only permit the state to persuade, cajole, or other-
wise convince the individual to alter her conduct, but they cannot
legitimate a restraint upon liberty.7 3 Political society thus offers pro-
tection to each of its members from unwelcome interference by pun-
ishing those who injure the interests of others; in exchange, society
may expect its members to agree to honor and defend the liberty of
one another.4
Despite Mill's antipaternalistic approach, children are not free to
do as they please. The doctrine of individual sovereignty applies only
68. Id. at 209.
69. Id. at 245.
70. Id. at 161; BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 263.
71. Mill found Bentham's utilitarianism emotionally narrow and espoused a political theory
that emphasized the happiness of others. Stefan Collini, Introduction to JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY WITH THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN AND CHAPTERS ON SOCIALISM at vii, xxvi (Stefan
Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1859).
72. MILL, supra note 71, at 13.
73. Id. Mill wrote:
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern
absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and
control . . . .That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted,
individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection.
Id.
74. Id. at 75-76.
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to those beings "in the maturity of their faculties. 75 The distinction
was significant for Mill, who argued that the state has no authority
to compel those who make bad decisions if they are capable of cor-
rection during a "free and equal discussion" about those choices.76
Children and other people below the age of majority, however, do
not have the capacity for improvement through rational discourse
and must be protected against their own actions. 77 Society, there-
fore, has absolute power over minors and may compel them to take
certain action in the hope of making them "capable of rational con-
duct in life." 78
Utilitarianism, however, uncritically accepts that rights acquisi-
tion is premised upon capacity. Although, in utilitarian terms, ca-
pacity is the ability to make rational choices in the pursuit of happi-
ness (rather than the competence to consent under social contract
theory), it is that capacity which circumscribes governmental inter-
ference with individual autonomy. Thus, each person may risk pain
freely (provided that risk does not affect the liberties of others) be-
cause each has the capacity to learn from her mistakes. But pater-
nalistic concerns do apply in the case of children, for they lack the
present ability to pursue their own happiness. Like social contract
75. Id. at 13.
76. Id. at 14.
77. Id. at 13-14. Mill wrote:
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to
human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of
young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or woman-
hood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be
protected against their own actions as well as against external injury. . . . But as
soon as mankind have attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement
by conviction or persuasion, .... compulsion . . . is no longer admissible as a means
to their own good, and justifiable only for the security of others.
Id. This quotation is remarkable for two reasons. First, Mill acknowledged that some young peo-
ple may have capacity but the law simply will not recognize their abilities until they reach an age
determined by law. Second, Mill was unique in his recognition of the equality of women. Some
have suggested that his relationship and subsequent marriage to Harriet Taylor greatly influenced
his thought in this regard. Collini, supra note 71, at xviii.
78. MILL, supra note 71, at 82. Mill wrote:
The existing generation is master both of the training and the entire circumstances of
the generation to come; it cannot indeed make them perfectly wise and good, because
it is itself so lamentably deficient in goodness and wisdom; and its best efforts are not
always, in individual cases, its most successful ones; but it is perfectly well able to
make the rising generation, as a whole, as good as, and a little better than, itself. If
society lets any considerable number of its members grow up mere children, incapable
of being acted on by rational consideration of distant motives, society has itself to
blame for the consequences.
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theory, the principle of utility is exclusionary: children are not au-
tonomous rights holders because of their incapacities.
C. Children as Moral Rights Holders
Kant believed that children can be rights holders (although not
autonomous ones) and rejected utilitarianism as'a philosophy of
right as well as an ethical theory. 79 A right, for Kant, meant having
"the capacity to obligate others" and the power to compel the per-
formance of that obligation." It is coercion, however, which enables
one to live as a free individual responsible only to oneself; thus a
right is an area of freedom from external constraint."1 This concep-
tion of freedom is crucial to Kant's theory of rights: freedom is an
innate right that belongs to all persons by virtue of their humanity
and grounds dignity, which is the source of each person's uncondi-
tional and incomparable moral worth.8 2 But law itself does not cre-
ate rights; rather, they spring from our innate freedom and auton-
omy and preexist the political state.83
Moral beings thus create a political society to ensure their free-
dom from external constraint and construct laws to impose duties 4
or to punish those who do not honor their obligations.85 The author-
ity to promulgate these laws resides only in the active citizenry of
the political state.86 To be an active citizen, the individual must be
free, equal, and independent: free to obey only those laws to which
he has given his consent, equal to all other citizens, and independent
of the arbitrary demands of others.87 Fitness to vote is a prerequisite
79. LESLIE A. MULHOLLAND, KANT'S SYSTEM OF RIGHTS 4 (1990). Mulholland's aim in writing
this book was to show how Kantian claims of rights can be justified.
80. KANT, supra note 3, at 45. Kant wrote:
Inasmuch as duties and rights are related to each other, why is moral . . .philosophy
usually . . . labeled the theory of duties and not also of rights? The reason for this is
that we know our own freedom (from which all moral laws and hence all rights as
well as duties are derived) only through the moral imperative, which is a proposition
commanding duties; the capacity to obligate others to a duty, that is, the concept of a
right, can be subsequently derived from this imperative.
Id.
81. Id. at 37.
82. IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS AND WHAT Is EN-
LIGHTENMENT? 54 (Lewis White Beck trans., The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1959) (1785).
83. John Ladd, Introduction to KANT, supra note 3, at xxi-xxii.
84. KANT, supra note 3, at 75-76.
85. Id. at 76-77.
86. Id. at 78-79.
87. Id. Kant wrote:
The members of such a society ...who are united for the purpose of making laws
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to citizenship, and those who are fit are independent and must vol-
untarily choose to take an active part in the society.88 Passive citi-
zens, although they have no right to guide the state, may "demand
that they be treated by others in accordance with the laws of natu-
ral freedom and equality . . . namely, that [they] be able to work
up from this passive status to an active status." 89
Children are passive citizens in Kant's political state because they
are dependent upon their parents for their support,90 and, although
they do have certain moral rights which spring from their innate
right to freedom, chjldren lack the capacity Kant associated with
greater liberty and political participation. Kant argued that the
child, as a person, is a free being who is brought into the world
without her consent by the action of her parents.9' The creation of
freedom, however, is not a purely physical process; consequently, the
physical act of conception does not explain the existence of liberty.92
Kant concluded that the right to freedom must inhere in all beings
prior to their conception and that it is this innate freedom that
makes the child more than a mere thing created by her parents over
which they would have a purely proprietary interest.93 Her parents'
voluntary act of bringing her into the world, therefore, imposes an
obligation to insure that the child suffers no further loss simply by
being in the world;94 from this obligation, the child acquires a right
to be cared for by her parents until she is capable of maintaining
herself. 95
The child, however, lacks the moral capacity to obligate another
and the power to compel the performance of his obligations, so the
are called citizens (cives). There are three juridical attributes inseparably bound up
with the nature of a citizen as such: first, the lawful freedom to obey no law other
than one to which he has given his consent, second, the civil equality of having no
people superior over him except another person whom he has just as much moral
capacity to bind juridically as the other has to bind him; third, the attribute of civil
independence that requires that he owe his existence and support, not to the arbitrary
will of another person in the society, but rather to his own rights and powers as a
member of the commonwealth ....
id.
88. Id. at 79.
89. Id. at 80.
90. Id. at 79-80.
91. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 114-15 (W. Hastie trans., Augustus M. Kelley
1974) (1887).
92. MULHOLLAND, supra note 79, at 227-28.
93. KANT, supra note 91, at 114-17.
94. MULHOLLAND, supra note 79, at 228.
95. KANT, supra note 91, at 114.
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child must rely on others to enforce her rights. She does not have all
the rights that adults have because of her inability to obligate
others; thus, the rights others will enforce for her are those rights
she has peculiarly as a child.96 One such right, the child's right to
upkeep and care, necessitates a correlative duty undertaken by her
parents to nourish and protect her.9" The enforcement of the right,
that is the power to compel the child's parents to perform their duty
as to their child, rests with those moral beings who have the capac-
ity to determine the behavior of others through choice and judg-
ment.9 8 The child, however, lacks that capacity, if only temporarily,
and the reliance on others to enforce her rights as well as to compel
her parents' obligations expires naturally upon the child's
emancipation. 9
From the parental obligation to care for the child flows a parental
right to train and educate her because of the parents' responsibility
for any harms caused by the child during her minority. 100 As long as
the child is "incapable of making proper use of its body as an Or-
ganism, and of its mind as an Understanding," she is subject to her
parents' authority.' ' The child, therefore, is not free to do as she
pleases; she is dependent upon her parents and must submit to their
commands until she attains the "capability of self-maintenance"
upon reaching the age of majority. 02 Only then does the child
regain her natural freedom and become her "own Master," thereby
absolving her parents of any further obligation.' 03 The child is free,
of course, to remain in the household after she reaches maturity, but
the parties' rights and obligations flow from a subsequent contrac-
tual arrangement and not from their familial relationship.0 4
Kant thus used capacity to explain why children not only have
certain limited rights yet no ability to exercise them, but also why
they are precluded from having certain rights entirely. Although
children have certain moral rights, such as an innate right to free-
dom and a right to care from their parents, they have no capacity to
96. MULHOLLAND, supra note 79, at 229.
97. KANT, supra note 91, at 114.
98. MULHOLLAND, supra note 79, at 8.
99. KANT, supra note 91, at 114, 116.
100. Id. at 116-17; MULHOLLAND, supra note 79, at 229.
101. KANT, supra note 91, at 116.
102. Id. at 118.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 118-19.
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enforce either right. Freedom for children, then, is best understood
as the potential for independence. Children also lack that capacity
to obligate others and to compel their performance, which precludes
children from acquiring certain other rights entirely. The Kantian
conception of capacity, therefore, insures children's dependency, ei-
ther upon their parents or upon some third party, and their exclu-
sion from greater political and legal participation.
Kant's contribution - that children have status as moral beings
from which form certain moral rights - has profoundly shaped
much of the children's rights debate. Kant does not dispute the cen-
trality of capacity to concepts of freedom and autonomy; conse-
quently, the rights children have are protective righfs that depend
upon others for enforcement. This reliance on others is, however,
merely the coinage of paternalism and hierarchy. Children have no
real autonomy and their rights, while they have seductive and co-
opting force because they appeal to us on an emotional level, confer
no real power. It is this powerlessness that makes children peculiarly
vulnerable to exclusion in our rights talk, even when we speak of
moral rights.
D. The Hegelian Dialectic
Kant's conception of the child's dependence upon and obedience
to her parents found new form in the work of Hegel, whose own
philosophy of right and morals is best understood in terms of the
dialectical movement."0 5 Stated simply, everything - each thought,
each condition - leads to its opposite and, through the process of
evolution, unites with that opposite to form a more complex, unified
whole."0 6 Thus, the state, in Hegel's political theory, is the result of
the unification of two opposites, individuality and universality; 10 7 a
105. HANs-GEORG GADAMER, HEGEL'S DIALECTIC: FIVE HERMENEUTICAL STUDIES (P. Christo-
pher Smith trans., Yale Univ. Press 1976) (1971); see MICHAEL ROSEN, HEGEL'S DIALECTIC AND
ITS CRITICISM (1982).
106. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 60 (Allen W. Wood ed. & H.B.
Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821) [hereinafter HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF RIGHT]. Including Hegel in any account of individual rights is somewhat controver-
sial since even Hegel's contemporaries saw his theories as providing justification for the Prussian
state. The modern view of Hegel is more generous. Allen W. Wood, Introduction to HEGEL, ELE-
MENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT supra, at viii-ix. In keeping with the modern view, I have
included Hegel in the history of the individualist tradition. Of course, I do so with some trepida-
tion because Hegel's writing is, at best, obscure and, at worst, unintelligible. Michael Inwood,
Introduction to HEGEL 1-4 (Michael Inwood ed., 1985).
107. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 106, at 287. Hegel wrote:
1002 [Vol. 42:983
RECONCEIVING RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN
rational society that permits the actualization of individual freedom,
or spirit, achieves this harmony of opposites and is, in itself, a com-
plex, unified form of individuality and universality. 10 8 Liberty, how-
ever, is more than doing as one pleases, more than the mere satis-
faction of personal ends; it is the meaning given to one's life through
choices made without external interference and the pursuit of ends
that are universal in scope. 10 9 It is only through membership in the
rational state that one may experience this highly evolved form of
freedom." 0
Spirit is itself an evolving concept and, in its most complex form,
is rational thought embodied in the will. "[S]pirit is initially intelli-
gence and ...the determinations through which it proceeds in its
development, from feeling to representational thinking to thought,
are the way by which it produces itself as will - which, as practical
spirit in general, is the proximate truth of intelligence." 1 ' In its
most basic form, the spirit is the immediate or natural will, deter-
mined by drives, desires, and inclinations." 2 Although natural, these
feelings are irrational while the will itself is analytical; it is the will,
therefore, that overcomes our irrational drives."13 Will in itself is
freedom, and as will is "thinking translating itself into existence" so
does it enable the translation of freedom into reality." 4
.A system of rights is the concrete actualization of freedom within
political society." 5 Some of these rights - the right to our own
bodies and free status and the right over our ethical lives, religions,
and consciences - are inalienable and imprescriptible." But the
precise content of our other rights as free beings cannot be deter-
mined outside the system of rational institutions that comprises the
Individuals ... embody a dual moment, namely the extreme of individuality . ..
and the extreme of universality . . . They can therefore attain their right in both of
these respects only in so far as they have actuality both as private and as substantial
persons. . . . [T]hey attain their right in the first respect directly; and in the second
respect, they attain it by discovering their essential self-consciousness in [social]
institutions ....
Id. at 287.
108. Id. at 286-87.
109. Id. at 276.
110. Id. at 276-77.
111. Id. at 37.
112. Id. at 45.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 35.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 95-96.
1993] 1003
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
state.1 ' These positive rights draw upon national character, histori-
cal development, and necessity for their context. 1 8 Positive law,
then, is the political society's determination of the content of these
other rights." 9
The emphasis on development in the Hegelian philosophy of
rights necessarily precludes the full and equal participation of chil-
dren in society. The child, according to Hegel, has only the potenti-
ality of reason and freedom; 20 because the child's will is only imme-
diate or natural, that will is both good and evil and as such is
opposed to the content of freedom. 12 ' The child, therefore, is less
accountable for her actions than a self-conscious individual who has
knowledge of the good,' 22 and her legal accountability is thereby
diminished.'2  The child also lacks the will necessary to own prop-
erty because her will does not have the ability to be recognized by
others; the child's sense of ownership, then, is purely internal to the
child. 24 The child does not even have a moral will, that ability to
determine herself, and must be determined by her parents. 2
The parental role in the upbringing of the child is, therefore, cru-
cial to the child's development of rationality and freedom. The child
begins life with a natural will, but she cannot develop into a rational
and free being by instinct alone; she must be taught self-sufficiency
and freedom.' 28  The child thus has a right to be brought up and
117. Id. at 28-29.
118. Id. at 28.
119. Id. at 28-29.
120. Id. at 45 ("The child is in itself a human being; it has reason only in itself, it is only the
potentiality of reason and freedom, and is therefore free only in accordance with this concept.
Now what exists as yet only in itself does not exist in actuality.").
121. Id. at 169.
122. Id. ("But the natural will is opposed to the content of freedom, and the child and unedu-
cated man whose wills are natural are for that reason accountable for their actions only to a lesser
degree. Thus, when we speak of human beings, we do not mean children but self-conscious indi-
viduals .... ").
123. Id. at 160 ("The right of the subject to know . . . action in its determination of good or
evil, legal or illegal, has the effect, in the case of children, imbeciles, and lunatics, of diminishing
or annulling . . . their responsibility in this respect, too .
124. Id. at 81-82.
125. Id. at 136.
126. Id. at 211-12. Hegel wrote:
Human beings do not arrive by instinct at what they are destined to become; on the
contrary, they must attain this by their own efforts . . ..
[Tiheir upbringing . . . has the negative determination of raising the children out
of the natural immediacy in which they originally exist to self-sufficiency and freedom
of personality, thereby enabling them to leave the natural unit of the family.
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supported by her family until she becomes self-sufficient. 127 Until
that time, her parents have a right over the child's will to eradicate
her natural but irrational desires and drives and to instill thought
and judgment. 12  Hegel suggested that discipline is the only way to
break the child's natural will; parents must command obedience and
punish without kindness or explanation. 29 "Unless the feeling of
subordination, which creates a longing to grow up, is nurtured in the
children, they become forward and impertinent."' 13
Hegel clearly envisions childhood as a developmental stage in the
human spirit. Children have the potential for rationality and free-
dom but lack the capacity for liberty because they are driven by
their feelings and emotions. Parents then must maintain and edu-
cate their children for the sole purpose of instilling in them that
sense of freedom that leads to self-sufficiency. But even parents'
rights in their children are limited by the aim of that upbringing -
to make their children self-sufficient - and by the need of the state
to replenish its citizenry. Thus, the civil society has the right to su-
pervise and influence the education of children when parents have
failed to fulfill their obligations.' 3 1
Id.
127. Id. at 211 ("Children have a right to be brought up and supported at the expense of the
family. The right of the parents to their children's services, as services, is based on and limited to
the common concern of caring for the family in general.").
128. Id. Hegel wrote:
[T]he right of the parents over the arbitrary will of the children is determined by the
end of bringing them up and subjecting them to discipline. The end to which punish-
ments are directed is not justice as such; it is rather of a subjective and moral nature,
seeking to have'a deterrent effect on a freedom which is still entrammelled in nature
and to raise the universal into the children's consciousness and will.
Id.
129. Id. at 211-12. Hegel wrote:
One of the chief moments in a child's upbringing is discipline, the purpose of which is
to break the child's self-will in order to eradicate the merely sensuous and natural.
One should not imagine that kindness alone is sufficient for this purpose . . . .If one
presents children with reasons, it is left to them to decide whether to accept these or
not, and thus everything is made to depend on their caprice. The fact that the parents
constitute the universal and essential element entails the need for obedience on the
part of the children.
Id. (footnote omitted).
130. Id. at 212.
131. Id. at 264. Hegel wrote:
In this character as a universal family, civil society has the duty and right, in the face
of arbitrariness and contingency on the part of the parents, to supervise and influence
the education ...of children in so far as this has a bearing on their capacity to
become members of society, and particularly if this education is to be completed not
by the parents themselves, but by others. In so far as communal arrangements can be
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.Hegel's paternalism is a frank acknowledgement of the powerless-
ness of children. Certainly his articulation of the relationship be-
tween the child, her parents, and the state, which has some currency
even today, envisions the child as a nonautonomous being subju-
gated to the will of her parents and of the state. Hegel's struggle
with the relationship between the individual and the government,
like that of his predecessors, however, does not challenge capacity as
a prerequisite to rights acquisition. Even those rights Hegel ac-
knowledged the child does have - like the right to be brought up
and supported by her family - are rooted in the child's current
incapacity for freedom and rationality. It is in this sense, then, that
these rights (if they can even be conceived of as rights) are exclu-
sionary and hierarchical.
E. Revising the Social Contract
This conception of a relationship between children, their parents,
and the state also influenced Rawls, who draws upon the theories of
Kant as well as those of Locke and Rousseau.132 Rawls argues that
justice is the governing principle of any political society, without
which its laws and institutions may be reformed or abolished. 133
Given the primacy of justice, Rawls contends that it and its princi-
ples, rather than participation in a given society or the formation of
a particular form of government, are the objects of the social con-
tract.134 Rawls thus imagines the formation of the social contract as
the collective effort of a group of rational and disinterested men and
women who, unable to know of their future positions in society or of
their conceptions of the good, create a state in which no one is ad-
vantaged or disadvantaged by the choices made during the con-
tract's formation.1 35 The rights and obligations of the citizen and
made for this purpose, it is likewise incumbent upon civil society to make them.
Id.
132. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, at viii (1971). Rawls writes:
What I have attempted to do is to generalize and carry to a higher order of abstrac-
tion the traditional theory of the social contract as represented by Locke, Rousseau,
and Kant. In this way I hope that the theory can be developed so that it is no longer
open to the more obvious objections often thought fatal to it.
Id.
133. Id. at 3.
134. Id. at 11. The principles of justice are "the principles that free and rational persons con-
cerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the
fundamental terms of their association." Id.
135. Id. at 12. Rawls refers to this as the original position in which all parties operate under a
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state naturally flow from this just conception of the political society:
once the veil of ignorance is lifted, no party to the original contract
should desire its rescission. 136
The principles of justice as they relate to Rawlsian conceptions of
rationality and morality do not accord children any greater liberty,
however, than do the classical formulations of right. Rawls states
that "the capacity for moral personality is a sufficient condition for
being entitled to equal justice."'," What Rawls means is that the
mere potential for moral personhood, defined as the capacity to ac-
quire a sense of justice and to have a conception of personal good as
expressed by a rational life plan, requires that each human being be
treated in accordance with the principles of justice.'38 Children have
both the potential to develop a rational life plan and a notion of
justice; in this sense, they have the capacity to acquire those compe-
tencies associated with moral personhood.' 9 Children actually fulfill
their potentialities and become moral persons when they attain the
age of reason and thus may participate in the formation of the social
contract. 4
0
But Rawls, like Kant, rejects the contention that the mere hu-
manness of children confers equal liberty. Rawls sees children as
moral primitives' 4' who must be protected from the "weakness and
infirmities of their reason and will in society"; others, therefore, are
authorized to act on children's behalf in a manner most likely to
secure their approval when they become rational persons. 42 Rawls's
paternalism would require that the guardian account for the individ-
ual child's preferences and interests to the extent that they are ra-
tional and limits the guardian's authority to the pursuit of the
child's expressed conception of good, if the child is capable of hav-
veil of ignorance. Id.
136. Id. at 61.
137. Id. at 505.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 509. Rawls provides a detailed account of the moral development of children. See
id. at 453-79.
140. Id. at 146.
141. Id. at 462.
142. Id. at 249. Rawls writes:
Thus the principles of paternalism are those that the parties would acknowledge in
the original position to protect themselves against the weakness and infirmities of
their reason and will in society. Others are au'thorized and sometimes required to act
on our behalf and to do what we would do for ourselves if we were rational, this
authorization coming into effect only when we cannot look after our own good.
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ing a conception of the good, has formed a conception, and has ex-
pressed it.'4" Although this may suggest that we should assume the
rationality of children before presuming to act in their interests, 14 4
Rawls does not argue that there is an affirmative obligation to learn
of these rational desires, although he clearly rejects as inconsistent
with his paternalistic principles an obligation to honor children's ir-
rational whims. 45 This emphasis on irrationality, then, merely reit-
erates the classical view of childhood and does not reconceive of
rights without the principle of capacity.
Rawls, like his predecessors, merely introduces the concept of a
child's moral right to expect certain treatment without displacing
the principle of capacity. He acknowledges the incapacities of chil-
dren and the need for paternalistic interventions but contends that
moral considerations limit paternalism in ways that preserve future
individual freedom. The notion of future-oriented consent, that the
child will see the wisdom of the choices made when she reaches the
age of capacity, and that parental authority is morally restricted to
the sphere of actions that the child might be expected to approve of
when she reaches maturity, is, however, self-fulfilling. The person
who consents in the future is the product of earlier paternalistic in-
terventions; she is certainly not the same person upon whom those
previous choices were imposed. Rawls thus finds within the child's
incapacity a certain right to be treated benevolently but not equally.
This distinction between rights flowing from the child's incapacity
and rights denied because of it, while it characterizes one aspect of
the current debate about children's rights, also tends to obscure the
other aspect: that is, the idea of capacity itself as a prerequisite to
having rights.
143. Id. at 249-50. Rawls writes:
Paternalistic decisions are to be guided by the individual's own settled preferences and
interests insofar as they are not irrational, or failing a knowledge of these, by the
theory of primary goods. As we know less and less about a person, we act for him as
we would act for ourselves from the standpoint of the original position.
Id. at 249.
144. See Worsfold, supra note 28, at 153. Worsfold argues that under a Rawlsian theory of
right, "children are presumed to be able to exercise their own rights unless all of society agrees
that someone else should make decisions for them," Id. at 143. 1 believe, however, that Rawls
makes no such claim, and Worsfold certainly never articulates what rights children do have within
Rawls's schema.
145. RAWLS, supra note 132, at 249-50.
1008 [Vol. 42:983
19931 RECONCEIVING RIGHTS POR CHILDREN 1009
F. Legal Positivism
Capacity does remain central to the modern positivist conception
of right, most vigorously defended by H.L.A. Hart, who contends
that rights are not grounded necessarily in any moral code. 1" Hart
argues that a legal system is comprised of social (nonmoral) rules
that originate exclusively in the social system.147 These rules estab-
lish obligations and duties and create legally redressable wrongs;148
they also confer public and private powers to enforce, create, and
vary these obligations and duties. 49 The private power to undertake
duties, to impose obligations on others, or to affect the application of
law, however, is dependent upon the capacity or status of the indi-
vidual to exercise this power.' 5 ° For Hart, to have power one must
also have the ability to exercise it, and only rational adults have that
146. Ronald Dworkin, Hart's most persistent critic, maintains that there is an essential connec-
tion between law and morality. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 1 (1986) [hereinafter DWOR-
KIN, LAW'S EMPIRE]. Hart and Dworkin have, for some time, symbolized the ongoing debate
between legal positivism and natural rights theory, although some have suggested that this debate
no longer has any force. See, e.g., Vincent A. Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradi-
tion: The Legacy of Hart and Sacks, 29 ARIz. L. REV. 413 (1987).
Dworkin contends that every person is morally entitled to equal respect and concern, that each
individual's pursuit of her personalized conception of what is good in life must be taken seriously.
RONALD DWORKIN. TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-73 (1977). Equal respect and concern does
not mean that each person must be treated the same or that the state must benefit and burden all
members of society equally. Id. at 273. The state's allocation of benefits and harms, the equal and
unequal distribution of goods, opportunities, and liberties, must simply ensure that each person's
right to equal respect and concern is not violated. Id. Individual liberty, therefore, exists not as a
right, id. at 269, but as a consequence of the right to equal respect and concern; nevertheless,
there are certain liberties that the state must respect, for a diminution of a liberty may entail a
violation of the fundamental right to equal respect and concern, id. at 272.
When legislatures make decisions that unequally benefit or burden its citizens, the courts are
often left with the difficult task of assessing the validity of these enactments. Dworkin contends
that judges make decisions in hard cases by resorting to a principle of integrity: "[P]ropositions of
law are true if they figure in or follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due
process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the community's legal practice."
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra, at 225. Dworkin's point is that legal reasoning is an inherently
moral enterprise, id. at 1; when there is more than one interpretation of applicable law, the judge
must ask which one best fits the community's legal standards, id. at 225-26.
What does this mean for children? Dworkin never directly answers this question, but he does
acknowledge that our interpretations of justice may, for example, permit parents to choose spouses
for their daughters on the theory that this is a social practice within a context of other practices
that we cannot call unjust. Id. at 204-05. 1 think, therefore, Dworkin would find other restrictions
placed on children as so entirely consistent with social practices that we cannot call them unjust
and since those practices are justified (in our culture at any rate) by reference to children's inca-
pacities, Dworkin's theory does little to advance the debate about children's rights.
147. NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 20 (1981).
148. Id.
149. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79 (1961).
150. MACCORMICK, supra note 147, at 21.
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present ability. 51
Even if there are moral rights, Hart forcefully contends that chil-
dren must be excluded from the class of rights holders. Hart argues
that "if there are any moral rights at all ...there is at least one
natural right, the equal right of all men to be free. 152 It is from
man's natural freedom and the ability to voluntarily limit his liberty
that moral rights are created;158  consequently, only "adult human
being[s]. capable of choice" have that power.' 54 Thus, infants do not
have a right to proper treatment although it may be morally wrong
to mistreat them;'55 at the same time, parents have a right to obedi-
ence from their children because of the special relationship in which
they stand to each other.' 50 Like all such rights, there must be some
justification for the interference with another's freedom,"' but in
the case of parents and children, this right is a natural one 58 that is
neither created nor conferred by voluntary action and thus requires
no special justification because children do not have the natural
right of freedom.
Hart, however, is not a children's rights theorist and, like the
aforementioned philosophers, focuses only peripherally on children's
rights. Yet these theories of individual rights have profoundly influ-
enced the debate over the rights of children. These accounts, which
attempt to explain the coexistence of individual liberty with coercive
state power, provide a foundation for our modern rights talk which
151. HART, supra note 149, at 28. ("Thus behind the power to make wills or contracts are rules
relating to capacity or minimum personal qualification (such as being adult or sane) which those
exercising the power must possess.").
152. H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, in HUMAN RIGHTS 61 (A.I. Melden ed.,
1970).
153. Id. at 62.
154. Id. at 61.
155. Id. at 65-66.
156. Id. at 71.
157. Id. at 68.
158. Id. at 71. Hart writes:
There remains a type of situation which may be thought of as creating rights and
obligations: where the parties have a special natural relationship, as in the case of
parent and child. The parent's moral right to obedience from his child would I sup-
pose now be thought to terminate when the child reaches the age "of discretion," but
the case is worth mentioning because some political philosophies have had recourse to
analogies with this case as an explanation of political obligation, and also because
even this case has some of the features we have distinguished in special rights, viz.,
the right arises out of a special relationship of the parties (though it is in this case a
natural relationship) and not out of the character of the actions to the performance of
which there is a right.
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inevitably structures and defines rights discourse. Consequently,
children's rights theorists draw on these philosophies to demonstrate
that children do have rights and to show that they do not. As will be
seen in the following section, the modern debate over children's
rights cannot be anything but a debate about capacity.
II. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
Children's rights theorists inevitably focus on the competency of
children when articulating the nature and scope of the rights held
by children. The least complex arguments directly link capacity and
rights; the source of the dispute among these thinkers is not the le-
gitimacy of that connection but whether and when children are
competent.159 Some theorists concede children's incapacities but find
they have certain moral rights stemming from the obligation to care
that serves to protect children from parental abuse and mistreat-
ment.1 60 Still others contend that incompetent children should not
be denied rights simply because they are unable to exercise them
and construct systems of agents or proxies who will exercise chil-
dren's rights for them."' Feminist theorists have tried to break
away from patriarchal concepts of individual autonomy and rights
by emphasizing the relationships between children and adults and
the rights that flow from these affiliations. But even these construc-
tions of rights, in their articulation of children's relationships, subtly
revolve around the principle of capacity. 62
A. Children as Competent Persons
Children's rights theorists use capacity to argue both for the lib-
eration and for the greater protection of children. Gary Melton, for
example, claims that competency is the overriding issue in the law
affecting children,"6 3 which should be informed by psychological re-
search.' 64 His findings and those of others suggest that while compe-
159. See infra notes 163-84 and accompanying text (discussing the children's rights theory that
uses capacity to argue for both the liberation and protection of children).
160. See infra notes 188-94 and accompanying text (discussing the moral interest theory of
rights).
161. See infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text (discussing the rights theory that suggests
that children have rights which can be exercised by competent persons).
162. See infra notes 195-215 and accompanying text (discussing the theories that purport not
to revolve around the issue of competency).
163. Melton, supra note 2, at 448.
164. Id. at 452-53.
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tency may be both developmentally and socially determined, even
young children seem to have the capacity to make certain deci-
sions.1 6 5 Child psychology, however, may in itself be a cultural in-
vention that predicts certain behavioral outcomes because of precon-
ceived societal norms.166 This difficulty in knowing precisely where
to draw the line between competency and incompetency is overcome
by presuming that children have capacity. Richard Farson and John
Caldwell Holt thus argue that children have the same political and
legal rights held by adults because children are competent. 167
Tying rights to capacity, however, permits opponents of children's
rights to claim that children, for their own protection, should not
and do not have political and legal rights. Bruce Hafen, an outspo-
ken critic of rights for children, argues, quite correctly, that the law
has "long assumed the necessity of competency."' 6" Citing to Locke
and Mill for the principle that children need a protective environ-
ment in which to develop their capacities, 69 Hafen contends that
according children rights prematurely will damage individual liberty
because children are incapable of making meaningful and rational
choices. 70 Additional psychological and sociological findings in di-
rect contradiction to the research cited by children's rights advo-
cates support these assertions.' 7 1 Joseph Goldstein also concurs with
Hafen's view of childhood and is a forceful proponent of expanded
parental control:
To be a child is to be at risk, dependent, and without capacity to decide
what is "best" for oneself.
To be an adult is to be a risktaker, independent, and with capacity and
authority to decide and to do what is "best" for oneself.
To be an adult who is a parent is to be presumed in law to have the
capacity, authority, and responsibility to determine and to do what is good
for one's children. 17
2
165. Id. at 460, 463; Arlene Skolnick, Introduction to RETHINKING CHILDHOOD: PERSPECTIVES
ON DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY 7 (Arlene Skolnick ed., 1976).
166. Skolnick, supra note 165, at 1-4; see William Kessen, The Child and Other Cultural
Inventions, in THE CHILD AND OTHER CULTURAL INVENTIONS. supra note 1, at 26, 29-30; Arlene
Skolnick, The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions of Child Development and Social Context, 39
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 38, 43 (Summer 1975).
167. FARSON, supra note 2, at 16; HOLT, supra note 2, at 18-19.
168. Hafen, supra note 2, at 613.
169. Id. at 612-13.
170. Id. at 657-58.
171. PURDY, supra note 2, at 87-123; Michael Wald, Children's Rights: A Framework for
Analysis, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 274-75 (1979).
172. Joseph Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental
Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645, 645 (1977). For other criticisms of the children's rights movement,
[Vol. 42:9831012
RECONCEIVING RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN
Children's rights advocates counter that principles of liberty and
justice mandate the extension of legal rights to those children with
capacity, but fail to challenge the legitimacy of the underlying pre-
mise that competency is a prerequisite to the acquisition of rights.
Hillary Rodham Clinton, for example, argues that the blanket pre-
sumption of children's incompetency should be set aside in favor of
a more discriminating set of assumptions about the variable capaci-
ties of certain children at certain ages.' She favors instead a pre-
sumption of capacity, the consequence of which would be the impo-
sition of responsibilities on, as well as the extension of rights to,
children.' Other proponents analogize the children's liberation
movement to the struggles for racial and gender equality and cau-
tion that our paternalistic practices may obscure a true appreciation
of children's competencies. 76 If we cannot demonstrate that chil-
dren do lack capacity, then we should treat any interference with
their liberty as a serious matter.17 6
Some theorists argue that certain individual rights theories pro-
vide sufficient justification for the extension of rights to children
without disputing the validity of capacity as an organizing principle.
Victor Worsfold interprets Rawls's theory of benevolent paternalism
to mean that we cannot act protectively towards children until we
see PURDY, supra note 2; Jeffrey Blustein, Child Rearing and Family Interests, in HAVING CHIL-
DREN: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL REFLECTIONS ON PARENTHOOD 115 (Onora O'Neill & Wil-
liam Ruddick eds., 1979).
173. Hillary Rodham, Children's Rights: A Legal Perspective, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: CON-
TEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 21, 33 (Patricia A. Vardin & Ilene N. Brody eds., 1979). Others who
agree with Rodham are: HENRY H. FOSTER, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN 73 (1974) (propos-
ing that children be granted individual freedom and autonomy commensurate with their matura-
tion and development and that the burden should be on those who abridge such freedom to show
that it is necessary and actually in the child's best interest); Bob Franklin, Introduction to THE
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 1, 7 (Bob Franklin ed., 1986) (arguing that the existing division between
the two age states is arbitrary and incoherent and that different qualifying ages for different
activities are needed); Kenneth Henley, The Authority to Educate, in HAVING CHILDREN: PHILO-
SOPHICAL AND LEGAL REFLECTIONS ON PARENTHOOD, supra note 172, at 254, 259 (arguing that
once a child is capable of rational deliberation and understands the rights of others, he cannot be
educated against his will); Pat Wald, Making Sense out of the Rights of Youth, 55 CHILD WEL-
FARE 379, 389 (1976) (supporting a general presumption that children be allowed the same rights
as adults unless there is a significant risk of irreversible damage from exercising such rights or a
general consensus backed by empirical data that at a certain age children do not possess suffi-
ciently developed physical or emotional skills to allow them to exercise those rights).
174. Rodham, supra note 2, at 508.
175. FARSON, supra note 2, at 213-27; FIRESTONE, supra note 9, at 81-118; HOLT, supra note 2,
at 82; Ann Palmeri, Childhood's End: Toward the Liberation of Children, in WHOSE CHILD?
105, 112-13 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980). See O'Neill, supra note 2, at 461,
for a rejection of the contention that children are like other oppressed social groups.
176. Palmeri, supra note 175, at 113.
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are satisfied that they cannot act for themselves.17 7 This presump-
tion of competency necessarily implies greater liberty for children,
although Worsfold never articulates the exact rights which flow
from his reconstruction of Rawlsian theory. 178 Laurence Houlgate,
however, interprets Rawls's theory as a restriction on the liberty of
children. He counters that Rawls's conception of rights unfairly dis-
criminates against children simply because of their age: Rawls's pa-
ternalism provides a sufficient justification to intervene but only in
the lives of the incompetent, a distinction, Houlgate insists, that dis-
criminates not between children and adults but between the compe-
tent and the incompetent. 79
Houlgate's point, that Rawls does not accept such paternalistic
limitations on adults and that all but the youngest children are suffi-
ciently rational to make their needs known, 8 ° merely reiterates the
competency of children; thus, Houlgate rejects legal theories that
deny children certain legal rights to liberty because of their sup-
posed incapacities. Houlgate argues that the Kantian conception of
moral agency, as well as the Lockean notion of autonomous will, are
fatally flawed because they begin from the false premise that chil-
dren are not moral agents, that they lack an autonomous will.181
The assumption is doubly 'misleading, according to Houlgate, be-
cause it not only incorrectly excludes morally developed children
from the class of moral agents, but it also precludes their acquisition
of rights: as children have certain moral rights anyway (like the
right not to be abused), it is false to say that moral agency is a
prerequisite to having rights.1 2 Houlgate similarly refutes Mill's
utilitarian view of children's rights on the grounds that Mill unduly
emphasizes the capacity for rational choice which, Houlgate con-
tends, children have; but Houlgate also lodges a moral objection to
the notion that the beneficial effect of restricting children's liberty is
a sufficient justification. 3 Houlgate thus concludes that because pa-
ternalistic legal theories provide no additional justification for the
177. Worsfold, supra note 28, at 156.
178. Id. at 143. Worsfold's interpretation of Rawls has been criticized by both proponents and
opponents of children's rights. See, e.g., LAURENCE D. HOULGATE, THE CHILD & THE STATE: A
NORMATIVE THEORY OF JUVENILE RIGHTS 88 (1980); Hafen, supra note 2, at 652-53.
179. HOULGATE, supra note 178, at 87-90.
180. Id. at 89.
181. Id. at 59.
182. Id. at 54-55.
183. Id. at 81.
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restriction of children's liberties, it is unjust to deny children their
rights in the absence of empirical evidence to support that they lack
capacity.184
B. Incompetent Children as Rights Holders
Even if children are incompetent, some theorists argue that chil-
dren are, in certain limited ways, rights holders. Howard Cohen, for
example, dismisses traditional paternalistic arguments based on chil-
dren's supposed incapacities; he contends that if children can borrow
those competencies necessary to the exercise of rights, then there is
no compelling reason to deny them the legal and political liberties
accorded adults.185 Cohen envisions a right not merely as a freedom
from noninterference but as a correlative obligation on another to
assist the rights holder to take some specified action. 8 As con-
structed, Cohen's theory permits us to obligate competent others on
behalf of the incapacitated by charging them with the responsibility
of exercising the rights of those who cannot do so for themselves. In
the case of children, Cohen envisions a system of child agents to
assist and advise children in the exercise of their liberty and, when
needed, to provide the competency required to assert their rights. 87
Under a moral interest theory of rights, however, children's in-
competencies create legally enforceable rights. The premise here is
that children have a moral right to be cared for and nurtured be-
cause they are incapable of caring for themselves.' 88 We can ac-
count for that right, the interest theorists contend, only if we char-
acterize children's rights as a set of goods or needs, in which no one
good (like liberty) takes precedence and any need may be overrid-
den by another if they conflict.' In the case of children, we may
order these interests: the more important the need the greater the
right.' 90 We protect this set of goods by imposing moral or legal
184. Id. at 102-03.
185. COHEN, supra note 2, at 57.
186. Id. at 56.
187. Id. at 74-90. For discussions of proxy consent, see WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CHILD?: THE
PROBLEMS OF PROXY CONSENT, supra note 2, and Koocher, supra note 2.
188. Neil MacCormick, Children's Rights: A Test-Case for Theories of Right, 62 ARCHIVES
PHIL. L. & SOC. PHIL. 305 (1976). MacCormick claims that this right is "simple and barely
contestable" although he does acknowledge that it is not a universally recognized legal right. Id.
at 305-06; see RUTH M. ADLER, TAKING JUVENILE JUSTICE SERIOUSLY (1985); O'Neill, supra
note 2.
189. ADLER, supra note 188, at 24.
190. Neil MacCormick argues that the characteristic failing of the interest theory is the con-
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constraints on others with respect to those interests; the duty im-
posed, therefore, does not preexist the right, and performance of the
obligation is not contingent upon the request or waiver of the inter-
est holder.1 91 Children thus have certain limited legal rights because
they have needs and wants which some adult (usually a parent)
must satisfy to ensure their survival.
Other theorists, however, argue that the child's right to self-deter-
mination limits the scope of paternalistic action taken on behalf of
the child.' 92 Although children need nurturing and protection be-
cause of their incompetencies, the decisions made by adults must
take into account the fact that children will themselves mature and
become responsible adults. For that reason, adults must recognize
that the actions they take should not unduly limit the opportunities
available to children as they mature.' Parents, therefore, must pre-
serve the rights children are not capable of exercising by limiting
their parental power. The child's incapacities thus mandate respect
nection made between needs, interests, and desires. MacCormick, supra note 188, at 311. This
suggests that needs are entirely constitutive of the good, but this is a substantive moral question
on which an account of rights must remain neutral. Id. MacCormick, therefore, proposes the
following formula:
[T]o ascribe to all members of a class C a right to treatment T is to presuppose that
T is, in all normal circumstances, a good for every member of C, and that T is a good
of such importance that it would be wrong to deny it to or withhold it from any
member of C.
Id.
Samuel Stoljar suggests that this "new test seems simple: the more important the good, the
greater the right attributed." SAMUEL STOLJAR. AN ANALYSIS OF RIGHTS 119 (1984). Adler, who
is influenced by MacCormick, seems to bolster Stoljar's thesis by identifying those interests of
children that take precedence. Basic interests, like the need for food, love, shelter, and clothing
take priority over intrinsic interests, like the need for privacy, and can be ordered. ADLER, supra
note 188, at 109-10.
191. MacCormick, supra note 188, at 305, 306-07. MacCormick is particularly concerned with
the will theory's account of rights, most clearly articulated by Hart. Id. That theory defines a
right as the "recognition of some individual's choice as being preeminent over the will of others as
to a given subject matter in a given relationship." Id. at 305. MacCormick claims that the will
theory cannot account for the child's right to be cared for because the will theory permits the
right holder to waive the right and, clearly, the child cannot waive her right to be nurtured. Id. at
306-07.
Similarly, O'Neill argues that we should think in terms of obligations to children rather than
rights because obligations are more easily constructed. O'Neill, supra note 2, at 456. She denies
that the rhetoric of rights is persuasive in the context of children because their dependence is not
like that of oppressed social groups. Id. at 461-62.
192. Sharon Bishop, Children, Autonomy and the Right to Self-Determination, in WHOSE
CHILD?, supra note 175, at 154.
193. FREEMAN, supra note 2, at 55; Bishop, supra note 192, at 169; Joel Feinberg, The Child's
Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD?, supra note 175, at 124, 145-46.
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for the child's potentialities and create a right to an open future. 94
C. Children's Rights and Relationships
Although most theorists construct children's rights within the
traditional framework of individual autonomy and responsibility, a
few scholars have deemphasized the significance of competency in
rights talk by focusing on individual relationships between children
and adults. Feminists object to notions of autonomy and individual-
ity as fundamentally hierarchical and patriarchal because these
principles emphasize power and minimalize the interconnectedness
of human beings. This underlying foundation has historically oper-
ated to exclude and disadvantage certain segments of society, most
notably women and people of color. Accordingly, many feminist the-
orists reject traditional rights discourse in favor of a construct that
emphasizes the relationships between and interdependencies of peo-
ple. As I hope to demonstrate, concepts of relationship and interde-
pendency collapse around notions of need, which, I contend, are
simply a less obvious way of talking about capacity. It is that sub-
tlety, however, which compels the more detailed analysis to follow.
Ferdinand Schoeman argues that intimacy between people should
be the central concern of any civilized society. In Schoeman's analy-
sis, children's incompetencies (whatever they may be) have little rel-
evance because rights are neither morally nor legally paramount. 95
Schoeman contends that the emphasis on the moral relevance of ca-
pacity to rights defines relationships in terms of autonomy and the
maximization of individual interests but ignores the moral value in-
herent in personal intimacy. 9 Intimacy, however, has a moral
worth independent of rights: by promoting understanding, trust, and
shared values, intimacy permits those emotional attachments that
children need and rights cannot provide.197 The state, therefore,
should encourage and promote relationships that foster intimacy be-
tween children and adults by fashioning rules that limit governmen-
tal intrusions to those situations where there is no choice but to
intervene.' 98
Alternatively, children may have rights irrespective of their ca-
194. Bishop, supra note 192, at 173-75; Feinberg, supra note 193, at 126.
195. Schoeman, supra note 2, at 287.
196. Id. at 279.
197. Id. at 281-82.
198. Id. at 287.
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pacities merely because the community accords rights to them. Sa-
muel Stoljar argues that rights are operative only as claims made by
free and equal individuals in a discursive community.199 The com-
munity, however, must replace its citizens over time to maintain its
existence and so relies on its children as a continuing source of new
members.20 ° Children lack the capacities normally associated with
having rights, so the community simply confers rights on them to
safeguard them as potential (competent) members of the commu-
nity and to insure the community's continued existence.0 1 It is chil-
dren's potentialities, rather than their limitations, therefore, that
make them rights holders.
Schoeman's notion of intimacy in interpersonal relationships and
Stoljar's concept of rights conferred by a discursive community have
found joint expression in the work of Martha Minow. Minow, like
Schoeman, argues that rights rhetoric makes an account of rights
for children problematic by unnecessarily excluding interpersonal
relationships and emphasizing individual autonomy.20 Issues of
competency, however, are mere proxies for what lawmakers think
children need, political decisions based not on scientific evidence but
on some sense of fulfilling society's purposes.2 03 In any event, the
notion of the autonomous rights holder is itself a fiction, ignoring as
it does the many ways in which adults are dependent on one an-
other.2 04 Drawing on feudal notions of status-based relationships, 26
Minow thus contends that rights talk may encompass notions of mu-
tual connection and need irrespective of concepts of capacity and
individual responsibility.0 6
Minow seeks to reconstruct rights as part of a communal lan-
guage embedded in social contexts that yet challenge patterns of
authority and power.20 7 By asserting rights for children, claimants
199. STOLJAR, supra note 190, at 119.
200. Id. at 120.
201. Id.
202. Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's
Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 17-18 (1986) ("Rights could be part of legal arrangements that
permit, not to mention promote, relationships for adults - while also combatting hierarchy and
fixed assignments of status. This conception remains problematic given a regime of rights that
emphasizes individual autonomy to the exclusion of duty and interpersonal connection.").
203. Id. at 5.
204. Id. ("Legal rules that imply that only independent people may enjoy rights fictionalize the
actual grant of rights to people who remain dependent in many ways.").
205. Id. at 16.
206. Id. at 17-18.
207. Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860,
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acknowledge that children are members of the community who im-
plicitly accept the decisions of that community as to their claims.2 0 8
This type of rights discourse neither creates conflict nor disrupts
community since the very act of claiming is, in itself, a communal
affirmation. 0 9 Rights claims, however, do not grant equality but
merely equality of attention: in this way, rights claims challenge ex-
isting hierarchies by making the community hear different voices.2 10
Community and claiming are part of a slow historical process that
will invigorate the debate about children's rights and will, someday,
lead to a better life for children through the articulation of ideal
relationships between children and adults in the larger
community. 11
Minow's rights theory is problematic in two respects. First, not-
withstanding her criticism of traditional rights discourse, she herself
fails to account for the organizing effect of the capacity principle.
Her emphasis on relationships presupposes a connection between
adults and children that merely underscores children's dependencies
rather than rendering them irrelevant. The fact that Minow finds
adults interdependent too, however, misses a fundamental distinc-
tion in these two types of relationships, a difference that Minow ac-
cepts as crucial. The interconnectedness of adults and children is
different in origin; children have no real choice in the creation or
continuation of the relationship precisely because they are thought
to "need" these relationships, and they need these relationships be-
cause they are immature and incompetent. Claiming rights, then, is
merely another way to catalogue children's dependencies and to por-
tray idyllic, rather than ideal, relationships; claiming rights discur-
sively limits rights talk to communal notions of development and
nurturing without examining hidden concepts of power and
inequality.
Second, if we speak of children's rights in relationships, we are
inevitably caught in that spiral of capacity that diverts us from our
task of honestly assessing the power we have over our children. Mi-
now's theory really is little more than a sophisticated version of the
argument that children should have rights because of their incom-
1861 (1987).
208. Id. at 1874-75.
209. Id. at 1874.
210. Id. at 1879-80.
211. Id. at 1876.
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petencies - indeed, I am not altogether certain that Minow would
dispute this assertion. Minow recognizes that "the question is very
truly how to 'reconcile the sight of a battered child with the belief
that we choose what happens to us, that we create our own world'
... ,"212 In attempting to reconcile positivist notions of right with
the concern for children's welfare, however, Minow comes down
squarely on the side of protective rights. "I find something terribly
lacking in rights for children that speak only of autonomy rather
than need, especially the central need for relationships with adults
who are themselves enabled to create settings where children can
thrive." '213
Ultimately, my difficulty with this line of reasoning stems from
my belief that feminist concerns about the importance of connection
and social relationships actually mask the power (perhaps the only
power) that women have. Ignoring our own hierarchical position in
relation to children may prevent us from seeing our acceptance of
capacity as a prerequisite to the acquisition of rights. I do not mean
to suggest that concerns about connectedness do not have a place in
some accounting of rights; after all, they are an integral part of
feminist doctrine. But we need to think carefully about the relation-
ships in which women may actually have some power for it is very
tempting to claim that our relationships with children are good for
them when they are really good for us.21 This may, in fact, dis-
empower children and allow us to obscure racial and gender-based
distinctions in their treatment under the guise of doing what is
needed.215 At best, talking about social relationships may engender
an attitude of benevolent paternalism, but it will not redress
problems of hierarchy and status.
212. Id. at 1863 (quoting G. Anzald6a,'La Prieta, in THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK at 198,
208 (C. Moraga & G. Anzaldfia eds., 1981)).
213. Id. at 1910.
214. FIRESTONE, supra note 9, at 118. Firestone argues that children are as oppressed as
women, often for the same reasons. She contends that childhood is a myth and that as women we
must speak to the oppression of children until they are able to tell their own story. Id. at 81-118.
Martha Fineman's work in many ways epitomizes Firestone's concerns about power. For a discus-
sion of how Fineman's forceful arguments about male-oriented custody decisions often overlook
the rights and voices of children, see MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN. THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY
(1991).
215. Katherine Hunt Federle & Meda Chesney-Lind, Special Issues in Juvenile Justice. Gen-
der, Race, and Ethnicity, in JUVENILE JUSTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY: TOWARD A NATIONAL
AGENDA 165, 165-66 (Ira M. Schwartz ed., 1992) (discussing how paternalistic policies mask
racism and sexism in the juvenile justice system and how, consequently, three distinct patterns of
institutionalization exist: one for girls, another for children of color, a third for nonminority boys).
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To summarize, capacity is relevant not only to determining what
rights children have, but also to determining whether they have any
rights at all. Thus, when we speak of rights as normative powers to
determine others' obligations, we do not include children. as rights
holders because they lack the requisite will to bind those others. Au-
tonomy and the capacity for rational choice are pertinent to this
analysis precisely because these constructs define the class of rights
holders. It is in this sense, then, that we say children do not have a
right to vote or a right to contract, but that children have a limited
right to an attorney or a right to due process. This distinction has
internal logic only if we rely on some concept of variable capacity;
and this kind of rights analysis permits us to say that a child cannot
participate in the political process because she cannot make the ra-
tional choices associated with citizenship but that she is sufficiently
competent to assist her lawyer in a delinquency proceeding.
Capacity also has relevance when we speak of children's moral
rights. While this kind of rights talk is particularly attractive to
children's rights theorists because it does not automatically exclude
children from the class of rights holders, it does define children's
interests in terms of their capacities. We thus may argue that all
citizens, adults and children alike, have a moral right to economic
security. But an interest theory of rights permits us to conditionalize
children's interests so that we may speak of children's greater (or
lesser) rights based on their needs and incapacities. While this may
not be a bad result or an unintended consequence of moral rights
theory, it does not help us answer more difficult questions about
children's rights to emotional, intellectual, and physical integrity
since these implicate parental decisions on upbringing and, conse-
quently, variable parental and societal mores. Thus, we cannot say a
child has a moral right to be free from spanking or a right to receive
her religious instruction of choice because moral rights have less
force in a society that prizes individuality and heterogeneity.
III. ON THE ROAD TO RECONSTRUCTING CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
I have suggested that we cannot account satisfactorily for chil-
dren's rights until we acknowledge the effects of capacity on our
rights talk, and I have shown that even the most sophisticated ver-
sion of rights encompasses principles of children's competencies. On
the one hand, capacity bars children from acquiring political and
legal rights because of the connection between having rights and the
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ability to exercise them. Given this premise, children's rights theo-
rists resort to a form of legal analysis that resembles little more
than a catalogue of children's abilities and developmental capacities.
On the other hand, however, is a clear acknowledgment of children
as beings worthy of moral respect. But notions of competency organ-
ize the ways in which we define, implement, and protect these moral
rights.
It is the hierarchical and exclusionary aspects of capacity that
limit children's legal, political, and moral rights in ways that vali-
date paternalistic assumptions and practices. When we speak of in-
dividual political and legal rights, we do not mean to include chil-
dren in that category of rights holders because we have accepted
capacity as a prerequisite to acquiring these rights and, therefore,
believe children are incapable of making the choices associated with
the power that rights bestow. Capacity also narrows the nature and
scope of children's moral rights to those that children need because
of their peculiar vulnerability, helplessness, and powerlessness. And
we implement those few rights that children do have in ways that
limit the choices children can make by requiring them to seek adult
assistance for the enforcement of the right. In many ways, the no-
tion of capacity acts as a blinder when we engage in rights discourse
and narrows our field of vision; we cannot broaden our perspective
until we acknowledge the ways in which capacity suppresses choice,
slights interests, inhibits growth, and excludes children.
The task before us, then, is a seemingly insurmountable one: to
reconstruct children's rights within a theory that is at once aware of
our rich tradition and yet sensitive to notions of status and power
that are deeply embedded in the competency principle. While I do
not propose any alternative and coherent theory here, I do think
that any future analysis is enriched by now considering the rights
claims made by other groups whose members undeniably lack the
capacities associated with autonomous rights holders. These theories
extend rights to the incompetent, human or otherwise, by creatively
redefining the role of capacity in the acquisition of rights. The suc-
cess of many of these rights claims, however, is somewhat limited
for precisely the same reason that children's claims are: capacity
organizes and structures their rights talk. But from a feminist per-
spective, there is value in this failure, for it exposes the many ways
in which capacity submerges and excludes the legitimate perspec-
tives not only of children, but also of other groups.
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In struggling with the notion of competency, accounts of rights
for the incompetent often follow the same patterns evinced in chil-
dren's rights theories. Animals and-mental incompetents thus have
the requisite capacity for rights or they have a form of capacity
which is adequate to the possession of rights. Henry Salt, for exam-
ple, contends that rights are based on appeals to justice and the de-
mand for freedom; because animals, like humans, have "individual-
ity, character, and reason," they are entitled to live their lives with
freedom and thus have the right to do so. 2 16 Similarly, advocates for
the mentally incapacitated argue that the mentally disabled and
critically ill retain many of the rights held by competent adults but
have simply lost the capacity to exercise them, so some other indi-
vidual is authorized to act on those rights. 17 Theorists of both
schools also redefine the capacity needed for a being to be identified
as a rights holder and conclude that human and nonhuman incom-
petents have this requisite capacity. 18
216. HENRY S. SALT, ANIMALS' RIGHTS CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO SOCIAL PROGRESS 16
(1980).
217. For discussions of these rights, see: Ira Mark Ellman, Cruzan v. Harmon and the Danger-
ous Claim That Others Can Exercise an Incapacitated Patient's Right to Die, 29 JURIMETRICS J.
389, 395 (1989) (the right to make decisions regarding medical care); Marcia Pearce Burgdorf &
Robert Burgdorf, Jr., A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Per-
sons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 855
(1975) (the right to equal treatment); Boris Feldman, Note, Mental Disability and the Right to
Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979) (the right to vote); Carol M. Friedman, Note, An Incompetent
Individual's Right to Die, 17 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 303 (1989) (the right to refuse medical treat-
ment); William Krais, Note, The Incompetent Developmentally Disabled Person's Right of Self-
Determination, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 333, 334 (1989) (the right to self-determination); Elizabeth
Shaver, Note, Do Not Resuscitate, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 218 (1989) (the right to self-
determination).
Exactly what standard is to apply when an individual acts on behalf of the mentally incapaci-
tated or critically ill patient is a matter of some dispute. Some favor a substituted judgment
standard, which requires the actor to consider the express or implied interests of the patient. See,
e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
Others advocate a best interests test that, while considering the preferences of the patient, may
also take into account other factors like the patient's quality of life. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486
A.2d 1209, 1232 (N.J. 1985). For a criticism of these tests, see Rebecca S. Dresser & John A.
Robertson, Quality of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 17 LAW
MED. & HEALTH CARE 234 (1989); Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 375 (1988).
218. Peter Singer, an animal rights activist, argues that animals have a capacity for suffering
and pain and therefore are entitled to have their interests considered equally with those of all
other beings who also suffer. PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: A NEW ETHICS FOR OUR
TREATMENT OF ANIMALS 9 (1975). Likewise, Kevin Quinn argues that the essential characteristic
of humanity is the capacity for interpersonal relationships and that it is this standard which
should inform our decisions about life-sustaining treatment. Kevin P. Quinn, Comment, The Best
Interests of Incompetent Patients: The Capacity for Interpersonal Relationships as a Standard
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Similarly, human and nonhuman incompetents, like children, are
thought to have interests which give rise to rights. Joel Feinberg, for
example, suggests that children, animals, and certain incompetent
human beings have rights for the simple reason that they are all
aware. According to Feinberg, if one has awareness, then one also
has expectations, desires, and purposes which give rise to identifiable
interests.219 One who has interests can be benefited, and if one can
be benefited, then one has rights. 2 0 Reason has nothing to do with
the acquisition of rights, merely their exercise, and since children,
animals, and incompetents lack reason, their rights may be asserted
by some third party with the requisite capacity." 1 Feinberg ac-
knowledges, however, that if a being is so incapacitated as to lack
awareness, then that being also lacks rights.222
Even Minow applies her theory of social relationships to the sta-
tus of the mentally incapacitated. As with her children's rights ihe-
ory, Minow contends that we must define the differences in our rela-
tionships rather than in traditional terms of right and individual
autonomy.223 The problem with rights talk, according to Minow, is
that it ignores social relationships and permits us to treat unequally
those who are different. 2 4 If, however, we ground rights in relation-
ships, we force those in power to recognize their interconnectedness
and to consider their decisions in that light. 25 Ironically, Minow's
theory of rights for the incompetent is more sympathetic to the no-
tion that relationships mask power and status.
Minow's analysis here is more honest, I think, because she is able
to leave behind her own perspectives and to recognize the hierarchi-
cal effects of relationships. Unlike her children's rights analysis, in
which her own perspective prevents her honest assessment of the re-
lationships between children and adults, Minow's analysis of rights
for the mentally incompetent acknowledges that the social relations
for Decisionmaking, 76 CAL. L. REv. 897, 901 (1988).
219. Joel Feinberg, The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations, in PHILOSOPHY AND EN-
VIRONMENTAL CRISIS 43, 61 (William T. Blackstone ed., 1974).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 47-50.
222. Id. at 61.
223. Martha Minow, When Difference Has Its Home.: Group Homes for the Mentally Re-
tarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. CR.-C.L. L. REV. I11,
175 (1987).
224. Id. at 183.
225. Id. at 189.
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approach recognizes the unavoidability of perspective.2 Minow cor-
rectly asserts that our relationships with each other are revealing for
precisely this reason. 27 But even Minow concedes that the social
relations approach does little to change "the way people think and
act much less actually recognize and deepen the shared humanity of
others."22 In the final analysis, Minow's social relations theory does
little to redress problems of hierarchy, exclusion, and power.
Theories of rights for human and nonhuman incompetents are im-
portant, not as theoretical opportunities to advance the children's
rights debate, but because these accounts reflect the delimiting qual-
ities of capacity. As with children, competency serves to exclude
claims of rights for incompetents from our rights discourse as some-
how illegitimate. Yet these children's rights theorists and children's
advocates have systematically failed to challenge the neutrality of
the competency principle in their own accounts of rights and thus
cannot adequately respond to traditional rights theorists.229 A post-
feminist perspective, however, rejects those movements that validate
the hierarchical nature of capacity and allows us to see how compe-
tency disadvantages those with different voices. By recognizing the
persistence of non-neutral features of traditional rights discourse, we
are able to move forward in our task of reconstructing rights not
only for children but for other excluded groups as well.
Theories of environmental rights recognize the inherent limita-
tions of the capacity principle and creatively reconstruct the dialec-
tic to- account for nonautonomous and insentient rights holders.
Known as deep ecology,230 the movement's most sophisticated
226. Id. at 183.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 187.
229. See R.G. FREY, INTERESTS AND RIGHTS: THE CASE AGAINST ANIMALS (1980); RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981); Jay Gold, The Status of the Permanently Uncon-
scious, 42 MERCER L. REV. 1087 (1991); H.J. McCloskey, Rights, 15 PHIL. Q. 115 (1965); Jan
Narveson, Animal Rights, 7 CAN. J. PHIL. 161 (1977).
230. Arne Naess is credited with coining the phrase "deep ecology." According to Naess, deep
ecology has seven principles: (1) acceptance of man as merely one of many organisms in the
environment; (2) the equal right of all organisms to live and blossom; (3) the enhancing potential
of diversity and symbiosis; (4) the need for an anti-class posture; (5) the dangers of pollution and
resource depletion; (6) the value of ecological complexity; and (7) the liberating influences of
decentralization and local autonomy on environmental policy. Arne Naess, The Shallow and the
Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. A Summary, 16 INQUIRY 95, 95-98 (1973).
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proponents advocate a nonanthropocentric 2a' and ecofeminist 23 2 per-
spective that is vigorously antihierarchical.3 3 If we no longer locate
231. Environmental rights theories fall generally into two schools: one emphasizes the rights of
humanity to a clean environment; the other contends that the environment itself is the rights
holder. Feinberg, for example, acknowledges that plants have no interests and therefore cannot
have rights but notes that we have sufficient interests in the environment to create rights in us.
Feinberg, supra note 219, at 52-54. William Blackstone argues that access to a livable environ-
ment is a human right which should become an enforceable legal right. William T. Blackstone,
Ethics and Ecology, in PHILOSOPHY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS, supra note 219, at 16, 30-33.
Joseph Sax articulates a public trust doctrine in which the right of each individual to be free from
environmental hazards (or to have access to environmental benefits) is a legal right against gov-
ernmental action that threatens to harm the environment. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doc-
trine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1979).
Those who seek to locate rights within the environment itself further divide along the issue of
anthropocentrism. Christopher Stone typifies those theorists who propose an anthropocentric view
of the environment. Stone proposes that the natural environment should be given legal rights
which may be enforced by a human guardian. Christopher P. Stone, Should Trees Have Stand-
ing? - Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972). Non-anthropo-
centric thinkers, however, reject a human centered, rights-based framework in favor of a holistic
gestalt of person-in-nature. See, e.g., Bill Devall, The Deep Ecology Movement, 20 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 299 (1980). Aldo Leopold was one of the first to articulate a land ethic premised on
humanity as merely one member of a biotic team. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC
WITH OTHER ESSAYS ON CONSERVATION FROM ROUND RIVER 219-20 (1966); see also Richard
Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View of Joseph Sax's Public Trust Theory of Envi-
ronmental Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of Law Reform, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 1209 (1991) (dismissing the public trust doctrine as defective and drawing the discussion
away from three previously articulated approaches to environmental rights: earth-centered ethics,
Native American thought, and ecofeminism); Calvin Martin, The American Indian as Miscast
Ecologist, in ECOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS 137 (Robert C. Schultz & J. Donald Hughes eds.,
1981) (asserting that Native Americans cannot teach us wise land use because their interpretation
of the world is radically different from our Western cosmology); James D. Whitehill, Ecological
Consciousness and Values: Japanese Perspectives, in ECOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS, supra, at 165
(stating that the Zen ethic of simplicity and austerity allows one to see the mutual dependency of
life); Michael E. Zimmerman, The Critique of Natural Rights and the Search for a Non-Anthro-
pocentric Basis for Moral Behavior, 19 J. VALUE INQUIRY 43 (1985) (arguing that until people
are committed to protecting human rights, it is unlikely that rights will be extended to nonhumans
and much less likely that anthropocentrism will be overcome).
232. See Karen J. Warren, The Power and Promise of Ecological Feminism, 12 ENVTL. ETH-
ICS 125, 126 (1990). Warren states: "The promise and power of ecological feminism is that it
provides a distinctive framework for reconceiving feminism and for developing an environmental
ethic which takes seriously connections between the domination of women and the domination of
nature." Id.; see also Jim Cheney, Eco-Feminism and Deep Ecology, 9 ENVTL. ETHICS 115
(1987) (arguing that attempts to overcome human alienation from nature fail because they are
unable to overcome the masculine sense of self and ethical theories that accompany the sense of
self); Marti Kheel, The Liberation of Nature: A Circular Affair, 7 ENVTL. ETHICS 135 (1985)
(discussing how feminist notions of holism reveal dualism in environmental thought); Ariel Kay
Salleh, Deeper Than Deep Ecology: The Eco-Feminist Connection, 6 ENVTL. ETHICS 339 (1984)
(criticizing the concept of deep ecology as articulated by Naess and Devall).
233. Ecofeminists argue that value-hierarchical, patriarchal thinking creates an oppressive con-
ceptual framework in which women and nature are subordinated to men's interests. Ecofeminism
rejects any way of thinking about nature that reflects values of domination and embraces notions
of relationships that celebrate and maintain differences. Warren, supra note 232, at 141-42. The
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ourselves pyramidally but vertically as merely members in a larger
community of others with whom we are connected, we can see the
hierarchical and essentially patriarchal limitations of anthropocentr-
ism."" In this reconstruction, capacity has no role because rights
and interests are themselves mere fictions that mask our anthropo-
centric view of the world and our relationship to the environment.2"'
We are left, then, with an inherently transformative and holistic
construct: we are one within a universe larger than humanity, a sin-
gle organism in which harm to a part damages the whole.236
It is the transformative aspect of deep ecology that, I think, has
the most to offer to the debate about the rights of children. Al-
though ecofeminism is acutely aware of the parallels between the
domination of women and the abuses to the environment, 237 in the
final analysis, the doctrine falls back on notions of relationships and
feminist principles of caring and loving that, in themselves, have hi-
238erarchical consequences, particularly when we speak of children. I
do not mean to suggest that there is no value in exposing patriarchal
structures for I recognize their subversive influences, but the empha-
sis on difference in feminist thought merely creates new hierarchies
that negatively affect children. The liberating effects of nonanthro-
pocentrism permit us to discard capacity and status and to trans-
form our rights talk by seeing ourselves, not in terms of relation-
ships but as existing within each other. It is the task of the
postfeminist to find this unity, to recognize being as significant, in
order for us to reconceive rights for children.
non-anthropocentric view also rejects hierarchy and articulates a view of humanity as in nature,
not above or outside it. Devall, supra note 231, at 303.
234. Salleh, supra note 232; Warren, supra note 232, at 126-32; Zimmerman, supra note 231,
at 46-48.
235. Zimmerman, supra note 231, at 50. Despite the limitations of rights, Zimmerman finds
them a "useful fiction for changing how human beings relate to each other." Id.
236. LEOPOLD. supra note 231; Devall, supra note 231. Ecofeminists warn against a "unity of
sameness" in which like beings are treated alike and differences are erased. Ecofeminists envision
a "loving perception" which presupposes and maintains differences between beings from which a
"tapestry of voices" emerges. Warren, supra note 232, at 137-39.
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CONCLUSION
I believe it is essential for us to recognize the centrality of capac-
ity as an organizing principle in our rights talk. Our rights tradition,
which emphasizes autonomy and individuality, perpetuates hierar-
chy and exclusion by limiting the class of rights holders to those
with capacity. Social contractarians, utilitarians, and legal posi-
tivists exclude children entirely from the class of rights holders be-
cause of their incapacities. Natural law theorists, while recognizing
that children are moral beings, construct protectionist rights for
children premised-on children's needs and wants. Even feminist the-
ories which emphasize relationships rather than rights envision chil-
dren as incompetent beings requiring protection and nurturing.
It is these effects of capacity that exclude children and that order
rights based on the acquisition of certain competencies. As long as
we premise rights upon ability and view children as undeveloped or
underdeveloped beings evolving into adulthood, we can discuss indi-
vidual rights only in terms of hierarchy and exclusion. To speak of
children's rights, however, means to hear children's voices without
the filtering influence of our preconceived notions about children's
incompetencies. To hear children's voices requires us to look beyond
our status-based relationships and to set aside the power that we
have. We need to acknowledge that rights have value because of
their power to eliminate hierarchy and exclusion, but as long as ca-
pacity plays a role in defining rights, we minimize value. Reconceiv-
ing rights means reconceiving our sameness; this we can accomplish
only if we cast capacity aside as an organizing principle in our
rights discourse.
The question then turns on whether we can speak of individual
rights without some reference to capacity. It may simply be impossi-
ble to construct rights without this context, for rights may not have
the force to challenge hierarchy. Certainly, if we are to acknowledge
a valid theory of children's rights, one that accounts for power and
status, then our rights talk must change dramatically. It is not en-
tirely clear that such change is possible within our legal tradition
although the implicit value of rights mandates that we must try. In
any event, I do think we must ask these questions if we are able to
walk down that road to reconceiving children's rights.
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